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Ken Rutherford
Our summer has been a busy one, with CISR recently completing the Regional Senior Managers’ Course in Conventional Weapons Destruction 
in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, this past June and July. With funding from the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs’ Office 
of Weapons Removal and Abatement and in partnership with the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), CISR’s fourth regional 
course, and the second held in Tajikistan, enrolled 25 senior managers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. 
In line with the concerns of the South and Central Asian region, the course focused on management topics pertinent to these countries, draw-
ing on the expertise of JMU College of Business professors. It also included technical training and field visits on survivor assistance, improvised 
explosive devices (IED) in the humanitarian context, weapons and ammunition destruction, as well as demining in mountainous and border 
environments. Local implementing partners and technical experts, including Fenix Insight, Norwegian People’s Aid, Swiss Foundation for 
Mine Action, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Tajikistan 
Ministry of Defense, and the Union of Sappers of Tajikistan joined CISR and TNMAC in providing instruction. The course bolstered the skills 
of already high-quality programs in the region, adding to the network of nearly 400 senior managers trained by CISR across the globe.  
For this issue of The Journal, we turn our attention to the Middle East, specifically Iraq and Syria, which present complex work environments 
for those working in humanitarian mine action. In their article, “Shattered Lives and Bodies: Recovery of Survivors of Improvised Explosive 
Devices and Explosive Remnants of War in Syria,” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, Doctors Without Borders) describes the types of injuries 
and the often difficult journey to treatment that internally displaced persons face when encountering improvised explosive devices (IED) and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW). MSF highlights the urgent need for a comprehensive mine response in Syria, including risk education, victim 
assistance, and mine clearance, and a greater coordinated effort from the international community to sponsor, support, and lead demining and 
other mine action activities. Moreover, Pehr Lodhammer (UNMAS) proposes the need for the mine action community to determine standards 
for properly assessing clearance values, specifically in Iraq. As with the Fallujah Iron Bridge, the monetary cost of clearing two IEDs from a ma-
jor piece of infrastructure in two weeks should be judged on the socioeconomic impact it has on the area and not compared to the per unit price 
of clearing landmines under ideal conditions.
In the feature section, contributions from Small Arms Survey, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and 
the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) discuss the safe and secure management of ammunition (SSMA). In their article, 
“Life-cycle Management of Ammunition: Safety, Security, and Sustainability of Conventional Ammunition Stockpiles,” Small Arms Survey ex-
plain how ammunition stockpiles threaten national security and public safety and how improving the technical, structural, and political aspects 
of the stockpile management process can ensure a safe and secure national stockpile. In their article, “Increasing Efforts in SSMA: What Does it 
Take?” GICHD and UNODA build on a GICHD study illustrating the current state of SSMA while reviewing developments, as well as identify-
ing capacity and implementation gaps in ammunition stockpile management. 
In Notes from the Field, MMG Lane Xang Minerals Limited Sepon (LXML), a mining company, discuss how they have integrated unex-
ploded ordnance (UXO) clearance into their mining operations and development projects in Laos. Sepon mine, owned by LXML, is situated in 
Vilabouly District, Savannakhet Province—one of the most bombed districts in Lao PDR. 
And finally, Donald Pratt at Messiah College and Nicholas Torbet from The HALO Trust present their research and development on the 
Hybrid Thermal Lance. The article presents an alternative method to destroy landmines and other thin-cased ordnance through burning and 
deflagrating the explosive inside. While at a relatively early stage of testing, the authors believe that sharing the results and making the concept 
open-source will benefit the HMA community.
September will be a busy month for CISR as we attend the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Geneva 
and present at both the regional workshop on Improvised Explosive Devices Threat Awareness in Astana, Kazakhstan, sponsored by the OSCE 
Programme Office in Dushanbe and Astana, and the Middle East Institute’s “Explosive Hazards in the Middle East: Addressing a Growing 
Threat,” which is the first conference in Washington, D.C. to focus exclusively on explosive hazard removal efforts in the Middle East. As our 
focus continues on the South/Central Asia region, we welcome contributions on HMA operations and programs in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In addition, as the HMA community increasingly leverages un-
manned aircraft systems (UAS) for various uses within the field, we welcome contributions from the community on UAS technology, case stud-
ies, and standards. Please be in touch with Journal staff regarding any questions you may have regarding submissions. 
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Ammunition is an essential resource for the im-plementation of a national defense and security policy. National ammunition stockpiles—regardless 
of their functional classification—can pose risks to national 
security and public safety.1 Poor accounting and inadequate 
physical security of storage facilities can lead to the diver-
sion of ammunition from the national stockpile to terrorists, 
criminals, and other armed groups, increasing insecurity and 
instability. Furthermore, the deterioration of munition com-
ponents can contribute to unplanned explosions at munitions 
sites (UEMS), which can have significant negative socio- 
economic and political consequences for the public and nation-
al governments.2 Comprehensive ammunition management 
ensures that the right types and quantities of ammunition are 
available, at the right time, to support national strategic and 
operational needs. It is also seen as the only long-term strat-
egy for preventing the excessive accumulation of surplus and 
for mitigating the safety and security risks inherent to all am-
munition stockpiles.3 Such an approach takes into account the 
technical aspects of ammunition management that are often 
covered by stockpile management efforts, as well as the relat-
ed structural and political dynamics. This results in planning 
challenges and has significant budgetary implications for gov-
ernments. A systems-based approach to the life-cycle man-
agement of ammunition (LCMA), and a long-term strategy to 
execute it, can help a state to address these challenges by min-
imizing the probability of excessive surplus accumulation and 
mitigating diversion and UEMS risks while meeting national 
strategic and operational needs.
This article provides an overview of the LCMA approach. 
Drawing on previous Small Arms Survey work such as 
A Practical Guide to LCMA Handbook and the case study, 
“LCMA: Lessons Learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” this 
article provides an abridged version of the LCMA model and 
the lessons learned from efforts to establish LCMA in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH).4–6 Perhaps more importantly, it also 
invites policy-practitioners to think creatively about ammuni-
tion management and argues that national ownership creates 
an enabling environment that supports the effective function-
ing of LCMA. The political and structural aspects of ammu-
nition management determine the efficiency of LCMA-related 
processes and activities: rather than being opposing concepts, 
the political dynamics and technical aspects of ammunition 
management are tightly intertwined.
What Is LCMA?  
Ensuring effective management of ammunition requires a 
comprehensive approach that allows states to meet their long-
term strategic and operational requirements and ensure safe 
and secure ammunition stockpiles. LCMA is an example of 
such an approach and recognizes the importance of adequate 
technical capabilities but also emphasizes the political dimen-
sion of managing ammunition across its life cycle: planning, 
procurement, stockpile management, and disposal. This sec-
tion provides an overview of the safety and security implica-
tions of improper stockpile management before introducing 
the concept of LCMA. 
UEMS, Diversion, and Surplus Accumulation
Despite growing awareness, in many states ineffective man-
agement of ammunition stockpiles continues to be the norm. 
All ammunition stockpiles pose a risk of UEMS and diversion 
SAFETY, SECURITY, AND 
SUSTAINABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL 
AMMUNITION STOCKPILES
by Jovana Carapic, Eric J. Deschambault, Paul Holtom, and Benjamin King [ Small Arms Survey ]
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Figure 1. Number of UEMS incidents per year, 1979–2018. (Data available until end of February 2018.)
Figure courtesy of Small Arms Survey (n.d.).
along all points of the national stockpile chain: manufacture, 
storage, employment, and disposal. According to the Small 
Arms Survey’s UEMS Database, about 580 UEMS occurred 
in more than 100 countries between 1979 and February 2018, 
often with grave social, economic, and political consequenc-
es (see Figure 1).7 In addition to fueling crime and terrorism, 
ammunition that is diverted from state stockpiles can affect 
the duration and intensity of armed conflicts.8 
States view conventional ammunition stockpiles as assets 
rather than liabilities and thus have a tendency to retain am-
munition stockpiles in excess of strategic and operation-
al requirements. In some contexts, together with ineffective 
stockpile management practices, this leads to the accumula-
tion of unsafe, unserviceable, and obsolete surpluses in the 
national stockpile. The result is a build-up of ammunition and 
an increase in safety and security risks.9 Surplus accumula-
tion also leads to a considerable financial burden for states in 
terms of operational, maintenance, and destruction costs.10 
Historically, national authorities, international donors, and 
practitioners have adopted technical approaches for dealing 
with surplus accumulation and mitigating the risk of UEMS 
and diversion. Often under the heading of physical securi-
ty and stockpile management (PSSM), the aim is to improve 
stockpile management practices by bringing them in line with 
international best practices, such as the measures elaborated in 
the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).11 
Technical approaches have a number of benefits: they can be 
cost-effective and help to mitigate the risk of UEMS, diversion, 
and surplus accumulation at storage locations. 
One of the main shortcomings of the technical approach is 
its lack of sustainability. Despite the increase in safety and 
security, most technical programs and initiatives to reduce 
ammunition-related risks are not usually designed or imple-
mented in a way that would address the systematic failures 
in stockpile management that lead to UEMS, diversion, and 
excessive surplus accumulation. A key challenge faced by na-
tional authorities, donors, and implementing organizations is 
to deliver appropriate technical programs to respond to inci-
dents of UEMS and diversion, as well as to address the under-
lying, higher-level causes of these events. The effectiveness of 
technical initiatives cannot be guaranteed without addressing 
systemic shortcomings. International guidelines emphasize 
that states take a proactive, rather than reactive, stance in en-
suring the safety and security of stockpiles to the highest pos-
sible standards.12 Effectively addressing both is contingent on 
adopting a comprehensive approach to ammunition manage-
ment, as outlined by the Small Arms Survey’s LCMA model. 
LCMA: A Comprehensive Means of  
Ammunition Management 
LCMA comprises a comprehensive set of integrated pro-
cesses and activities that ensure sustainable and cost- 
effective management of ammunition, delivering a safe and 
secure stockpile that meets national strategic and operation-
al needs. The LCMA approach recognizes the importance of 
adequate technical capabilities but also emphasizes the polit-
ical dimension of managing ammunition across its life cycle. 
It requires that state actors at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels work together on multiple ammunition-related 
aspects to ensure cost-effective management of the entire na-
tional stockpile.
The LMCA model draws on current practices among a 
number of states that participate in NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) program as well as other NATO partners that 
6
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implement comprehensive ammunition management sys-
tems.13 These states have well-established militaries and a 
long history of ammunition management. While national 
approaches may differ, one feature is central to all: the ef-
fectiveness of LCMA systems in these states is ensured by a 
high degree of national ownership. This feature guarantees 
an enabling environment, a prerequisite for sustainable am-
munition management. 
LCMA Model
By analyzing the various LCMA systems observed in the 
NATO and PfP states, the Small Arms Survey developed a gen-
eral LCMA model (Figure 2). It is composed of one structural 
element and four functional elements. To be effective, all ele-
ments must work together as an integrated and efficient whole. 
The structural element, which involves national ownership 
and its associated enabling conditions, supports the effective 
and efficient management of ammunition across the life cycle 
to ensure the integrity and sustainability of the LCMA sys-
tem. Often recognized as a key aspect of LCMA, the structur-
al aspects of ammunition management are rarely elaborated 
in detail by international guidelines. The LCMA model also 
consists of four functional elements: planning, procurement, 
stockpile management, and disposal, which ensure the safety, 
security, and cost-effectiveness of ammunition stockpiles. The 
four functional elements draw and, where necessary, elabo-
rate on the best practices for stockpile management accord-
ing to the IATG. 
Representations of LCMA models 
tend to be linear depictions that mask 
the degree of interaction and sequenc-
ing among the functional elements of 
the system. Such depictions also tend to 
omit the key role of national ownership, 
which complements and supports the 
functional elements and is critical to the 
overall integrity of an LCMA system. 
In contrast, Figure 2 highlights the in-
terrelationships among the elements. It 
also stresses the importance of the two 
crucial aspects of ammunition manage-
ment: the political, which is the struc-
tural element necessary for effectiveness 
of the functional elements; and the tech-
nical, which is the functional elements 
necessary for the management of am-
munition across its life cycle. 
Milestones 
Throughout an LCMA system, decisions are made in order to 
manage the national stockpile and mitigate the risk of UEMS 
and diversion. Milestones are points in the life cycle where the 
most critical decisions are made regarding transition across 
the functional elements of LCMA and their related processes 
and activities.14 There are a number of milestones within any 
LCMA system. Examples include:
 » Planning to procurement: involves the development 
and approval of strategic plans and budgets for the ac-
quisition and management of types and quantities of 
ammunition necessary for achieving defense goals and 
operational requirements.
 » Procurement to stockpile management: involves the 
procurement of ammunition based on confirmation 
that the items being acquired are safe and suitable for 
service (also known as an S3 process).
 » Stockpile management to disposal: involves the ap-
proval of disposal of ammunition following a national 
disposal review.
 » Disposal to planning: involves the certification or con-
firmation of disposal activities.
Prerequisites for Implementing LCMA Systems
An enabling environment is a prerequisite for sustainable 
ammunition management. It allows for long-term policies and 
plans to become targeted, integrated, and coordinated pro-
grams aimed at effectively managing the national stockpile 
Figure 2. The Small Arms Survey’s LCMA Model. 
Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.15
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and mitigating the risks posed by the ammunition. There is 
agreement, both within and outside the U.N. system, that a 
high degree of national ownership is necessary for sustainable 
ammunition management.16 Despite the recognition that na-
tional ownership matters, there is little guidance on what it 
means in practice. This section provides an overview of the 
concept of national ownership before discussing the enabling 
conditions that foster it and support effective implementation 
of LCMA. 
National Ownership for 
Ammunition Management
At its core, national ownership is grounded in the premise 
that states need to take responsibility for ammunition man-
agement and be actively engaged in ensuring the safety and 
security of their stockpiles. A state demonstrates national 
ownership when national actors—including relevant politi-
cal decision-makers, armed forces planning and logistics staff, 
and procurement authorities—have defined and active roles 
in designing, implementing, and monitoring all processes and 
activities across the ammunition life cycle, such as planning, 
procurement, stockpile management, and disposal.
The IATG state that “the primary responsibility for conven-
tional ammunition stockpile management shall rest with the 
Government of the state holding the ammunition.”17 It follows 
that national ownership is not simply about political buy-in 
for ammunition management but also about taking respon-
sibility for setting up and maintaining an LCMA system by: 
 » Establishing a set of effective life-cycle and enabling 
processes that allow them to make milestone-relevant 
decisions and to plan and implement programs for each 
functional element of LCMA.18,19
 » Providing national financial resources for the system 
to cover the cost of procurement and post-acquisition 
costs, such as those associated with storage, surveillance, 
transportation, maintenance, security, and disposal.
 » Facilitating the establishment of the enabling condi-
tions necessary for supporting the effective manage-
ment of ammunition over its life cycle.
Enabling Conditions for LCMA 
There is a dynamic relationship between national ownership 
and the enabling conditions that make LCMA possible. In 
turn, these conditions foster national ownership for ammuni-
tion management and ensure the sustainability of the LCMA 
system as a whole. They include a normative framework, an 
organizational framework, infrastructure and equipment, 
and human resources.
The concept of enabling conditions is inherent in U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 72/55 “Problems arising from 
the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles 
in surplus” (2017), which recognizes “the importance of ap-
propriate national ammunition management structures and 
procedures, including laws and regulations, training and doc-
trine, equipment and maintenance, personnel management 
and finances, and infrastructure in order to ensure sustain-
ability in ammunition management.”20 The rest of this section 
presents the four enabling conditions in more detail.
Normative Framework 
An LCMA system needs to be anchored in and informed by a 
normative framework that provides guidance on ammunition 
management at different operational levels. The development 
of an appropriate framework is a national responsibility and 
is based on national needs and priorities. For states without a 
normative framework in place, the IATG offer concrete guid-
ance and tools for ammunition safety and security, as well as 
a model for effective stockpile management. They also provide 
advice on developing technical directives for ammunition 
management and on the roles and competencies of ammuni-
tion specialists.21  
Organizational Framework 
National ownership for ammunition management calls for 
context-specific organizational frameworks (i.e., relevant insti-
tutional and organizational structures that are led and staffed 
by national personnel) and allows for coordination and over-
sight of ammunition management processes and activities, and 
ensures efficient implementation. Establishing a framework in-
volves meeting a number of preconditions, including: 
 » A high level of institutional and organizational devel-
opment. An LCMA system demands a high level of in-
stitutional and organizational development, with clearly 
defined tasks, competencies, and responsibilities. 
 » A high level of flexibility. The organizational structure 
must also be flexible enough to ensure that there is in-
formation exchange, coordination, and oversight among 
relevant stakeholders, both international and national.
Infrastructure and Equipment 
Infrastructure and equipment are essential to support the 
implementation of LCMA. A state cannot claim to have the 
capacity to ensure the safety and security of its stockpiles or 
the disposal of surplus without them. For this reason, the last 
decade has seen a considerable increase in the number and 
scale of international assistance programs related to capacity 
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development.22 Since 2012, the international community has 
coordinated its efforts to provide infrastructure upgrades to 
strategic ammunition (and weapon) storage. Similar efforts 
have also been seen in Mali, where the international com-
munity has focused on improving physical security infra-
structure in order to prevent weapons and ammunition from 
getting into the hands of insurgent groups.23
Human Resources 
The implementation and sustainability of an LCMA system 
depends on the availability of adequately trained personnel 
at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) and the ex-
istence of effective personnel management systems. Training 
on basic stockpile management activities—such as cleaning, 
storehouse maintenance and organization, inspection and 
surveillance of ammunition, inventory management, and ac-
counting—can help to reduce the probability of UEMS and 
diversion. In addition, training is key in fostering national 
ownership and is most effective when it is transferred and in-
tegrated into a recipient state’s institutions.  
Functional Elements of an LCMA System 
There are four functional elements of the LCMA model that 
relate to the different stages of the ammunition life cycle: 
planning, procurement, stockpile management, and disposal. 
The elements must be managed in order to ensure that they 
operate in a coordinated manner and that the risk of UEMS 
and diversion is kept to a minimum. Each functional element 
is summarized below. 
Planning
Planning is essential to the overall management of ammuni-
tion. An LCMA system must be thoroughly planned from the 
outset, with dedicated resources and procedures put in place 
in advance of any new acquisitions or other alterations to the 
system. Direction is provided by a state’s national defense 
policy, which is translated into a comprehensive, long-term 
defense strategy that defines the scope of LCMA planning 
(Figure 3). Consequently, a primary milestone of the planning 
element is the development of a cohesive national ammuni-
tion stockpile plan that meets the long-term defense planning 
goals.
The LCMA planning begins by defining the nation’s am-
munition requirements and continues through the develop-
ment of integrated programs. It is incumbent on planners 
to understand all of the downstream ramifications of their 
stockpile-related decisions. For this to take place, an informa-
tion management system must be in place to ensure oversight 
is maintained over the entire system. An information man-
agement system also allows planners to gather essential in-
formation for the development of element-specific programs, 
which turn identified needs into achievable outputs given fi-
nancial and human resource constraints.24 
Procurement 
An effective procurement process delivers ammunition that 
is suitable for the implementation of the national defense pol-
icy in a safe and secure manner.25 While the planning element 
of the LCMA model determines the general parameters for the 
quantity and type of ammunition to be procured, the procure-
ment element begins with the approval of ammunition for ac-
quisition and concludes with its entry into service.
Even before an order is placed, a limited amount of ammu-
nition is usually acquired for testing (i.e., demonstration and 
evaluation) purposes to determine the safety and suitability for 
service of the ammunition.26 Once ammunition is deemed suit-
able for service, it can be acquired either from producers lo-
cated within their national territory or, more commonly, from 
commercial suppliers in other states. States import new and 
surplus ammunition via commercial sales, government-to-
government sales, or gifts. The import of surplus ammunition 
is cost-effective if it is in good condition.27 However, purchas-
ing from old stockpiles can lead to “controversial quality con-
trol, dubious traceability issues, and procurement fraud.”28  
Procurement systems are expected to adhere to good gov-
ernance principles and include robust anti-corruption pro-
visions. Regardless of the mode of acquisition, states manage 
the safety and security of ammunition during the acquisition 
process, with a focus on ensuring state control and oversight, 
comprehensive registration and record-keeping, and safe 
and secure transportation.29 States also develop laws, regula-
tions, and administrative procedures to control and regulate 
the import, export, transit or transshipment, and brokering 
of military items and technologies, including ammunition. 
Recording each stage of the acquisition process and of the am-
munition’s entry into service is essential to ensuring the safety 
and security of the ammunition.30 This is particularly true at 
moments when the ammunition is susceptible to theft, loss, or 
an unplanned explosion.
Stockpile Management 
In order to meet operational and strategic requirements, as 
well as to ensure the safety and security of stored items, it is 
important to emplace effective stockpile management poli-
cies and practices. Stockpile management begins when am-
munition enters the stockpile and ends when it leaves, be it 
9
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 22.2
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2018
10 FEATURE @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
through issuance (for training or operations), consumption 
(ammunition spent), or disposal (through exports or demil-
itarization). With many complex and interrelated processes 
and activities, stockpile management requires continuous 
review and assessment to ensure the adequacy of resourc-
es, infrastructure, equipment, and personnel. These review 
processes form the key milestones of the stockpile manage-
ment element. 
The stockpile management element of the Survey’s LCMA 
model is based on the IATG—more specifically, the IATG 
core groups of activities around which all stockpile manage-
ment processes and activities are structured.31 To ensure effec-
tive stockpile management and reduce the risk of unplanned 
explosions and diversion, the core groups interact very close-
ly, with individual activities depending on or influencing 
each other across group boundaries. The six core groups of 
ammunition-based activities are accounting, destruction, 
maintenance, stockpile security, storage, and transport.
Management of the risks inherent to ammunition stor-
age is a fundamental component of stockpile management. 
Adherence to the IATG fulfills many of the requirements of 
an integrated risk management system.32  Figure 4 outlines the 
overarching risk management approach of the IATG, in par-
ticular the relationship between the different components of 
risk management.33  The IATG also offer detailed explanations 
of each component of risk management and techniques for 
stockpile management.34
Disposal 
Disposal is the removal of unsafe, unserviceable, obsolete, 
or excess ammunition from the national stockpile. Until it 
has been physically removed from the stockpile, disposal- 
designated ammunition is treated as part of the national 
stockpile.35 A state’s decision to dispose of ammunition as 
part of a national disposal review is the first step in the pro-
cess, and a number of factors can influence that decision. The 
process ends with the physical removal of disposal-designated 
ammunition from the stockpile as a result of a disposal action. 
A number of milestones are related to disposal and include
 » The decision to dispose of ammunition. 
 » The selection of a disposal method and process in the 
case of demilitarization. 
 » The completion of disposal activities. 
 » The confirmation that ammunition has been disposed 
of properly and in accordance with a disposal decision. 
While historically various disposal methods were avail-
able to a state, there currently are only two internationally- 
accepted disposal methods: exports (sales or donations) and 
demilitarization. Of these two, states tend to prefer export; 
however, international arms and ammunition control efforts 
emphasize demilitarization.36 The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) 
establishes legally binding commitments governing the ex-
port, import, transit, transshipment, and brokering of con-
ventional arms and ammunition. A number of technologies 
are potentially available for demilitarization, each one with 
advantages and disadvantages. Although commonly used, 
open burning (OB) and open detonation (OD) are modes of 
disposal that are increasingly discouraged by states due to 
health and environmental concerns.37a 
Age, unclear history, or the existence of internal damage, 
corrosion, and other dangerous conditions (such as exuda-
tion or crystallization) can mean demilitarization causes 
significantly greater risks than those associated with new 
ammunition. Advanced planning is key to fully address-
ing ammunition disposal methodologies and risks, and can 
reduce costs and ensure appropriate equipment and train-
ing for individuals assigned to accomplish safe and effi-
cient disposal and decommissioning tasks. Managing risk 
for demilitarization also requires developing effective mu-
nitions emergency response processes and procedures for 
the decommissioning of contaminated sites, both of which 
require the participation of specially trained individuals. 
National Defense Policy
Long-term defense strategy
LCMA planningDeveloped by the MoD,
approved by the head of
state/national legislature
Developed by chief of
defense/joint chiefs of staff
approved by the MoD
Developed by general
or joint staff, approved by
joint chiefs of staff
Figure 3. Long-term defense planning and LCMA.
Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.6
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LCMA in Context: Lessons Learned from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
Recognizing that a comprehensive approach is best suited to 
address complex ammunition management challenges, this 
section uses the LCMA model presented as a framework for 
analyzing the emergence of an LCMA system in BiH during 
the period 2012–2016. The section stresses the importance of 
focusing on ammunition management as a distinct area of 
concern when considering ammunition, weapons, and explo-
sives (AWE) challenges in post-conflict settings. It highlights 
ten lessons learned from implementing four of the five main 
elements of an effective LCMA system: national ownership, 
planning, stockpile management, and disposal. The fifth ele-
ment has not been implemented, as BiH has not yet made pro-
visions for the procurement of ammunition. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia had serious repercus-
sions for ammunition management in BiH. The onset of con-
flict, in June 1991, combined with a U.N. arms embargo on 
Yugoslavia’s successor states in January 1992, had serious neg-
ative consequences for ammunition management capacities 
and practices.38 The immediate post-conflict period was char-
acterized by efforts to exercise basic control of ammunition 
and weapon stockpiles in BiH instead of developing life-cycle 
management systems for ammunition and weapons.39 
By 2000, the focus had switched toward defense reform, mil-
itary downsizing, and the identification and disposal of sur-
plus weapons and ammunition. Despite the urgency to deal 
with the surplus ammunition, and the establishment of a 
normative framework to do so, competing political interests 
undermined the disposal process (Figure 5). Consequently, 
international pressure for addressing the safety and securi-
ty concerns of the national ammunition stockpile increased 
by the end of the 2000s, paving the way for the develop-
ment of a plan to establish an LCMA system in the country. 
The priority for BiH to date has been to identify and dis-
pose of excessive, unstable, and unsafe ammunition and to 
put in place the planning and management processes that 
will ensure the safety and security of the ammunition that 
the country needs to implement its national defense and 
security strategy.
Lesson 1: National ownership is fundamental for ef-
fective LCMA. The international community substituted for 
a lack of national capacity to manage and dispose of surplus 
ammunition in post-conflict BiH. Since 2012, however, the in-
ternational community has focused on building national ca-
pacity to ensure ownership of the LCMA system. As a result 
of these efforts, high-ranking BiH Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) per-
sonnel, including the minister of defense and chief of defense, 
are now taking the lead in related decision-making and plan-
ning on ammunition as well as ensuring that armed forces 
personnel are sufficiently trained. 
Lesson 2: The coordinated, long-term commitment of 
international partners is essential for the establishment of 
LCMA in a post-conflict setting. Prior to 2013, there was a 
lack of coordination, communication, and information shar-
ing between international and regional organizations, states, 
and NGOs working to address BiH’s ammunition stockpile 
Figure 4. IATG risk management matrix.
Figure courtesy of Carapic, et al.6,11, 37b
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challenges.40 To address these issues, all key internation-
al stakeholders committed to providing expertise and re-
sources in a complementary and coordinated way to help the 
BiH MoD and the AFBiH address the challenges posed by 
the AWE stockpile.41 By the end of 2012, thanks to the non- 
paper, the international community had streamlined 
its efforts on how to address BiH’s ammunition stock- 
pile challenges.40
Lesson 3: Implementing effective LCMA in a post- 
conflict setting requires early agreement on overall objec-
tives, specific priorities, and resource requirements. During 
the first quarter of 2013, the international community con-
vened a task force consisting of key international and BiH 
stakeholders to develop an AWE Master Plan that defined the 
desired outcome for addressing AWE challenges as “the trans-
parent disposal of surplus ammunition and weapons and the 
introduction of a sustainable ammunition and weapons life-
cycle management system in BiH.”42 The AWE Master Plan 
provided clarity on the international community’s capacities, 
resources, and potential contributions in addressing BiH’s 
AWE challenges. It also defined the roles and responsibilities 
of the different international actors, the BiH MoD, and the 
AFBiH.43 The AWE Master Plan was endorsed by all relevant 
national and international stakeholders. 
Lesson 4: Sustainable LCMA requires robust organiza-
tional structures and appropriate personnel. 
The AWE Master Plan defined the organizational structure 
required to support the programs and activities for the trans-
parent disposal of surplus ammunition and the implemen-
tation of sustainable LCMA.44 This organizational structure 
ensured effective and efficient coordination of national and 
international activities, confidence among all key stakehold-
ers, and empowered BiH authorities and senior leaders within 
international organizations. 
Moreover, appropriately experienced, skilled, and motivated 
personnel should be placed in key positions to ensure that the 
organizational structure delivers the desired changes. A criti-
cal factor in the case of BiH was the European Union Force 
(EUFOR) commander’s decision to create the position of se-
nior advisor for weapons and ammunition disposal (SAWAD) 
in April 2013. SAWAD can influence decision-making, over-
sees implementation, and ensures the overall coordination of 
Master Plan activities. 
Lesson 5: Successful LCMA rests on a comprehensive in-
ventory of the ammunition stockpile.
It was not until 2012 that a decision was made for BiH to 
conduct a comprehensive inventory—locally referred to as the 
100 per cent inventory—of its ammunition stockpile, create a 
single national ammunition list, and establish a national in-
ventory management system.45 BiH’s limited capacity made it 
difficult to conduct the 100 percent inventory in an effective 
and timely manner.46 Therefore, from 2012 to 2013, AFBiH 
personnel received training in basic ammunition handling, 
testing, storage, LCMA regulations and standard operating 
procedures (SOP), and inventory management.42 The AFBiH 
began the ‘100 percent inventory’ in 2013 MoD, and it is ex-
pected to be finished by the end of 2018. 
Lesson 6: Stockpile safety depends on an assessment of 
the condition of stored ammunition. A key component of ef-
fective LCMA, more specifically of the 100 percent inventory 
referred to previously, is the ability to determine the physi-
cal condition, chemical stability, and hazard classification 
of ammunition in the national stockpile.47 With the support 
of the international community and as part of the 100 per-
cent inventory mentioned in Lesson 5, the BiH MoD decided 
to undertake 
 » A stock-check of the entire ammunition stockpile. 
 » A visual technical inspection of all the ammunition. 
 » A chemical test of the propellant, using quick propellant 
analysis kits (QPAK) provided by the Austrian compo-
nent of the mobile training team (MTT) Project.48 
These additional assessments laid the foundations for the de-
velopment of an ammunition surveillance system in BiH. 
Lesson 7: Adequate resources and capacities are needed 
for a safe and secure ammunition stockpile. Effective stock-
pile management involves the safe and secure storage, trans-
portation, and handling of ammunition.49 In accordance with 
BiH’s Law on Defence and the future operational require-
ments of the AFBiH, OSCE SECUP, and UNDP EXPLODE, 
assistance projects upgraded safety and security standards for 
two prospective ammunition storage sites in BiH: Kula 1 and 
2, and Krupa. The Doboj demilitarization facility was also 
upgraded, because these sites have capacity to house BiH re-
quired ammunition and can be maintained by the AFBiH.50 
These infrastructure upgrades, as well as donations of equip-
ment and training provided by the EUFOR MTT Project 
troop-contributing nations, reflect good coordination be-
tween BiH and its international partners.51 
Lesson 8: Effective and efficient surplus disposal re-
quires adequate normative and institutional frameworks, 
as well as the necessary political will. As noted previously, 
ammunition disposal was a politically sensitive issue during 
the late 2000s. While presidential approval was (and contin-
ues to be) required for any form of disposal, the process for 
authorization is now more efficient, and approval is grant-
ed more quickly than in the past.40 The reduction in the time 
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taken for the presidential approval led to a significant increase 
in the ammunition disposal rate during the period 2015–2016 
(see Figure 5).52 
Despite BiH authorities preferring to export their surplus 
ammunition, demilitarization continues to be the primary 
mode of disposal in the country.52 International stakeholders 
have facilitated the demilitarization and destruction process 
by increasing the capacity and skills of AFBiH personnel and 
employing independent contractors at the TROM Doboj de-
militarization facility and the Glamoc range.51
Lesson 9: Serviceable but surplus ammunition may be 
disposed of through export sales authorized in conformity 
with a country’s international commitments. Prior to 2013, 
international partners and key BiH stakeholders had diver-
gent views regarding the export of surplus ammunition.40 
Stakeholders have come to accept export sales as a valid meth-
od for the disposal of surplus if carried out by national au-
thorities in accordance with international standards, such 
as those of the ATT.54 Several independent assessments have 
concluded that BiH’s arms export control legislation and ad-
ministrative procedures meet such standards.55 The BiH MoD 
has developed administrative guidance for the disposal of 
surplus by export in the 2012 Plan for Resolving Surplus.56
Lesson 10: Serviceable but surplus ammunition can 
also be disposed of through international donation to 
demonstrate support for international partners. The BiH 
president must approve the disposal of surplus through in-
ternational donation after an assessment of political, strate-
gic, and foreign policy considerations. MoD BiH and AFBiH 
representatives have raised two sets of concerns regarding 
such donations. The first is a concern over foregone profit. 
International stakeholders, however, have stressed that dona-
tions help to dispose of ammunition that, while still service-
able, needs to be used quickly.52 Such ammunition is unlikely 
to meet the quality needs of commercial importers. The sec-
ond concern relates to the perceived risk of donated material 
diverting.57 This reflects recent media coverage of the pos-
sible diversion of BiH donations intended for Iraqi govern-
ment forces to non-state armed groups in the Middle East and 
North Africa.58 Yet diversion risks can be reduced via interna-
tional cooperation and good practice.55 At the same time, such 
donations can allow BiH to contribute to efforts to strengthen 
international peace and security.59
Looking Forward
A comprehensive ammunition management approach is re-
quired to ensure that a state’s national stockpile is safe, se-
cure, and operational when needed in order to meet national 
and strategic objectives. The LCMA approach not only allows 
for the mitigation of the risk of UEMS and diversion, but also 
Figure 5. Disposal of ammunition in BiH using open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) and other forms of demilitarization, 2006–
2016.
Figure courtesy of Carapic and Holtom, 2018.
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ensures sustainability of international cooperation and assis-
tance projects. The most recent General Assembly Resolution 
on the “Problems arising from the accumulation of conven-
tional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” (A/RES/70/35) 
stresses the need to develop and implement cooperation and 
assistance programs that ensure sustainability—i.e., are able 
to mitigate the immediate risk of UEMS and diversion and 
have a lasting impact on ammunition management practices 
at the national level. To date, a limited number of internation-
al cooperation and assistance projects have been designed and 
implemented with the intention of ensuring sustainability by 
addressing ammunition management practices across the life 
cycle: from planning to procurement, stockpile management, 
and disposal. The case of BiH is an illustrative example.   
From a practical perspective, this article provides an over-
view of the experience and lessons learned from efforts to es-
tablish and implement a sustainable LCMA system in BiH. 
The BiH experience is useful for other prolonged post-conflict 
environments or those states aiming to establish an LCMA 
system. Establishing and implementing better stockpile man-
agement processes and ultimately LCMA are long-term and 
challenging endeavors. These efforts do not need to be accom-
plished all at one time. Improvements can be incrementally 
structured and implemented based on national priorities, 
available resources, capacities, and capabilities, considering 
the potential efficiencies and benefits that will be derived 
along the way with regards to the national stockpile’s func-
tionality, safety, security, and ability to meet national strategic 
and operational needs. 
See endnotes page 59
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INCREASING EFFORTS IN SSMA: 
WHAT DOES IT TAKE?
by Ursign Hofmann, Samuel Paunila [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ], 
and Katherine Prizeman [ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs1 ]
FEATURE
T
he inadequate management of conventional ammu-
nition results in negative consequences such as di-
version to illicit groups and unplanned explosions 
at munitions sites (UEMS). Both diversion and unintended 
blasts can result in a severe humanitarian impact, undermine 
development efforts, compromise defense capabilities, and 
lead to instability.
In recognition of this recurring danger, political, normative, 
and operational efforts have increased to promote the safe and 
secure management of ammunition (SSMA). As the issue en-
joys greater national, regional, and international attention, 
stakeholders should simultaneously take stock of achieve-
ments, consider if current efforts address the challenges at 
hand, and appreciate what further steps are needed to achieve 
greater success. 
This article builds on a Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) study depicting the cur-
rent state of SSMA.2 It reviews recent normative developments 
and identifies capacity and implementation gaps for further 
consideration by relevant stakeholders. 
Better Safe Than Sorry: The Case for SSMA
Ammunition is usually stored in a legal, state-owned stock-
pile. Unfortunately, diversion from state-owned stockpiles is 
not uncommon. Such diversion risks fueling regional pro-
liferation as recently evidenced in Libya, Southeast Europe, 
Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire, and is increasingly understood as a 
major threat to peace and security.3,4 
Diverted conventional ammunition can be leveraged by non-
state actors, including terrorist groups. Ammunition diver-
sion and use by such third parties is widespread, including 
as energetic material for improvised explosive devices (IED). 
Considering the manufacture of IEDs, large-caliber ammuni-
tion such as artillery shells and mortar bombs are particularly 
dangerous due to their substantial high-explosive content and 
casings designed to spray quantities of lethal fragments over 
a wide area. 
Poorly-managed ammunition also poses a safety threat—a 
development experienced by half of the world’s countries in 
the last forty years.5 In 2017, at least one major incident in-
volving a UEMS was reported every month.6 In light of the 
sensitivities surrounding ammunition management and the 
reputational concerns of states, the actual number of inci-
dents may be significantly higher than reported. 
When ammunition depots are located in urban areas, explo-
sions can have an even greater humanitarian impact, further 
resulting in considerable socio-economic, environmental, 
and financial repercussions. The implications for national 
defense capabilities are also apparent. A sudden loss of ser-
viceable ammunition may reduce the state’s ability to defend 
national territory, and the armed forces may attempt to resup-
ply with an urgent procurement for an often-significant cost. 
Conversely, preventing incidents is known to cost a fraction of 
repairing the damage and replenishing stock. Beyond finan-
cial considerations, regaining trust with affected communi-
ties is also a formidable task.7
To address the risks of diversion and unintended explosions, 
SSMA is growing as a political, normative, and operational 
priority. What are the key recent developments related to am-
munition safety and security, and what are their implications 
for the future direction of SSMA?
Expanding Normative Framework 
In the early 2000s, poor ammunition-management prac-
tices became obvious. In response, and after a recommenda-
tion by a Panel of Governmental Experts in 2008, the United 
Nations created a set of International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATG) in 2011. The IATG are meant to offer prac-
tical, coherent, authoritative, step-by-step advice for those who 
wish to improve the safety and security of ammunition storage 
sites. Simultaneously, the U.N. SaferGuard Programme was es-
tablished, which provides the United Nations with knowledge 
management to oversee and disseminate the IATG. Both were 
welcomed in the U.N. General Assembly by resolution 66/42. 
With universal acceptance of the IATG, a clear and coherent 
reference point is now available for national ammunition man-
agement regulations and relevant regional initiatives, as well as 
state- and non-state-led SSMA programs.8
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Since ammunition was initially addressed under U.N. guid-
ance in a 1997 report of a Panel of Governmental Experts 
on Small Arms, a patchwork of international and regional 
instruments—particularly well developed on the African 
continent—now address ammunition.9,10 Most instruments 
have approached ammunition through specific reference to 
small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). Adopted in 2013, the 
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the latest addition to this frame-
work through its prohibitions and export assessment crite-
ria, which apply to ammunition utilized in weapons covered 
by the ATT’s scope. This includes all major categories of con-
ventional weapons as well as SA/LW. In exporting ammuni-
tion, adequate stockpile management is key to mitigating the 
risk of diversion. Stockpile management also features areas for 
The terrifying scale of the blast of an arms warehouse that sparked a mass evacuation of 20,000 people in Balakleya, Ukraine, 
March 2017.
Images courtesy of YouTube/Oleksii Tamrazov.
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treaty-related international cooperation and assistance.11 It re-
mains to be seen how ATT States Parties will concretely share 
good practices and report on effective measures taken to ad-
dress the diversion of transferred ammunition.12 
Current frameworks, which sometimes differ in their defini-
tion of ammunition, pose challenges to their effective and co-
herent implementation.13 More systematic scrutiny on how to 
bring regional regimes closer to global frameworks is also war-
ranted. A positive example of this is the call by the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Ministerial 
Council in 2017 to explore the possibility of voluntary use of 
the IATG in relevant OSCE assistance projects.14
Toward More Coherent Political Action
In parallel to normative developments, several political pro-
cesses on ammunition management have taken shape within 
and outside of the United Nations. 
Since 2015 and through its SSMA initiative, Switzerland 
has stimulated open and inclusive discussions among policy- 
practitioners and technical experts on ammunition management 
implementation challenges and responses.15 By doing so, the Swiss 
initiative has contributed to setting the stage and focusing politi-
cal attention to an issue that has historically been sensitive and 
sometimes difficult to address in multilateral settings. 
The General Assembly has addressed “problems arising from 
the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in 
surplus” since 2004 when it first decided to include this topic 
as a stand-alone agenda item.16 The resolution has been gener-
ally adopted on a biennial basis with the latest iteration from 
2017.17 In this context of heightened political momentum on 
SSMA, the latest version established a multilateral platform 
for discussions. Coordinated by Germany, the lead sponsor, 
the resolution mandated to identify urgent issues on which 
progress can be made in the area of conventional ammuni-
tion. These informal discussions are intended to inform the 
work of a Group of Governmental Experts, which will be con-
vened by the U.N. Secretary-General in 2020.18 In parallel, 
the African Union (A.U.) adopted its regional Ammunition 
Safety and Security Management initiative in 2017 in support 
of the A.U.’s vision of silencing the guns in Africa by 2020. 
Importantly, the scope of discussions in international and re-
gional fora appears to be expanding from surplus ammunition 
to address broader issues related to the safety and security of 
ammunition management. This development is positive as the 
risks of diversion and explosions are best addressed through 
a comprehensive, whole-life-cycle approach to ammunition 
management. Proper management of all conventional ammu-
nition, including but not limited to surplus stocks, is necessary.
A good example of an ammunition depot: ammunition warehouse ASP 7 (Ammunition Supply Point 7), Italy.
Image courtesy of Dino Fracchia/Alamy Stock Photo.
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Deliberate efforts are now needed to ensure that the vari-
ous political initiatives do not duplicate one another. The 
U.N. General Assembly track has thus far prompted substan-
tive exchanges on trends in diversion and on the provision 
of technical assistance and capacity building, thereby clari-
fying current gaps and possible remedial actions concerning 
ammunition safety and security. Concurrently, the rather re-
gional and more ‘operational’ SSMA initiatives of Switzerland 
and the A.U. could be harnessed to complement and enhance 
the General Assembly platform. 
Seeing Big: From Providing Security to Broader 
SSMA Dividends
Historically, policymakers have perceived ammunition man-
agement as a highly technical activity involving only armed 
forces and state security preparedness. This perspective has, 
however, started to encompass the bigger picture, including 
the community safety and environmental contamination as-
pects of ammunition management, as well as to recognize 
the complementary role and capabilities of non-military per-
sonnel and organizations. Indeed, SSMA can demonstrate 
considerable dividends in view of broader peace and securi-
ty efforts and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(see Figure 1, next page). The Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDG) provide a framework to systematically articulate the 
many dividends of ammunition management. 
Improving stockpile management and data collection capac-
ities is key to curbing illicit arms flows and helps to prevent 
unplanned explosions, enabling at-risk countries to better 
protect civilians; increase urban safety for all groups of soci-
ety such as the safety of housing, basic services, and education 
facilities; and provide a safe and secure work place for am-
munition storage guards. The SDGs can also serve as a vehi-
cle for strengthening national institutions in charge of SSMA 
and promoting their effectiveness, accountability, and trans-
parency, as well as for more consistent participation of wom-
en in decision-making. Finally, the international cooperation 
and assistance in SSMA contributes to reducing inequalities 
among countries, supporting those in greatest need.19 The U.N. 
General Assembly has called on states to consider ammuni-
tion management as part of their national efforts to achieve 
the SDGs and to consider the development of ammunition- 
related national indicators.20
Similarly, by reducing the risk of diversion, SSMA can be un-
derstood as a means to sustain peace and represents a tangi-
ble contribution to the U.N. Secretary-General’s new agenda 
for disarmament. “Securing Our Common Future,” the newly 
-minted disarmament agenda, argues that poorly-managed 
stockpiles of conventional arms and ammunition constitute 
humanitarian hazards and pose threats to peace and secu-
rity. The Secretary-General acknowledges that proper physi-
cal security and stockpile management supports and sustains 
An example of an exposed, insecure, and potentially unsafe stockpile of ammunition in Kosovo.
Image courtesy of PCM ERW Risk Management and MAT Kosovo LLC.
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development efforts and is an important component of how 
disarmament saves lives.21
At a time when many donors consider their political and 
financial support as concrete investments, implementing part-
ners are called upon to demonstrate tangible impacts. Whether 
or not these investments are perceived to pay off may deter-
mine future funding trends and modalities. To date, SSMA 
has largely remained reliant on output-based measurements 
(e.g., the number of munitions destroyed or storage areas 
refurbished).22 Approaching SSMA as an element of wider 
frameworks, such as normative (treaties, IATG), development 
(SDGs), governance (security sector reform), or peace and 
security, and embracing a longer-term, broad perspective for 
support, could help identify and better demonstrate the long-
term impact and effectiveness of SSMA projects. 
From Ad Hoc to Investing in Sustainable Change
Years of practice in the SSMA domain have shown that im-
mediate, short-term interventions can be essential in prevent-
ing a disaster from materializing and saving lives. However, 
experience has also illustrated that a comprehensive, gradual 
approach to institutional, legislative, and operational changes 
BROADER POLICY LANDSCAPE OF AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
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Figure 1. Broader policy landscape of SSMA.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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in ammunition management is necessary to attain sustain-
able solutions.23 Supported by international and regional good 
practice, expertise, and guidelines, international assistance 
has taken place through direct engagement with national au-
thorities. Investing in lasting change should logically drive 
international assistance. For example, ammunition plan-
ning should entail its entire life cycle: all technical, financial, 
and normative aspects concerning its safe arrival in a stock-
pile, security of stocks, sheltered and cool storage locations, 
inspections and maintenance protocols, trained personnel, 
transport, use, and final disposal. Whole-of-life assistance 
should become the norm rather than the exception.
National ownership has not always been sufficiently prior-
itized in international assistance frameworks. In the area of 
ammunition management, assistance has sometimes lacked 
adequate national responsibility and accountability. This, 
compounded by a persisting lack of awareness of the risks as-
sociated with the consequences of inadequate ammunition 
management practices, has hampered progress in SSMA. A 
mix of tailored incentives must be offered more convincingly 
to increase appreciation of these risks and foster understand-
ing of the breadth of measures an appropriate response entails. 
As opposed to focusing only on the Ministry of Defence and 
relevant departments of the armed forces, greater awareness is 
Figure 2. GICHD Ammunition Safety Management tool set—step 2F: how to rehabilitate an existing ammunition storage area.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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required across state institutions on the accountability of the 
state for ammunition management. Sensitizing and involv-
ing oversight bodies such as parliaments could be considered 
to that effect. Moreover, national commitment may need to 
be nurtured from the top all the way down to the keeper of 
a local ammunition store. To do so effectively, trust building 
over time is essential and presupposes a long-term partner-
ship with international stakeholders. 
Effective and well-coordinated national structures are evi-
dence that ammunition management is nationally owned. 
Yet the reality is that structures often lack adequate author-
ity, skills, and resources if they exist at all (e.g., national SA/
LW commissions). The establishment, equipment, and em-
powerment of national institutions should thus be given in-
creased attention, which includes the development of skills 
and knowledge specific to stakeholder groups at all levels. 
Equally important is to anchor a clear division of labor and 
responsibilities between national and interna-
tional partners in national action plans and/
or roadmaps. 
As important as such documents are in acti-
vating national ownership, they may not suc-
ceed without concurrent competent guidance 
and capacity development. This is particularly 
true for identifying and establishing context- 
specific, needs-based national priorities. 
Failing to do so presents the risk of open- 
ended, ineffective international assistance. 
In this vein, the development of a nation-
al normative and technical framework that 
draws on the IATG is crucial for sound im-
plementation and the sustainability of SSMA. 
Certain national norms might often be in 
place, but these are generally spread over disci-
plines associated with fire safety, construction 
standards, inventory controls, and transport 
and storage of hazardous materials. They are 
rarely considered together as one entity to ad-
dress the full scope of SSMA. Additionally, na-
tional principles of ammunition management 
may not always reflect the latest normative or 
technological developments. There may also 
be challenges related to oversight and enforce-
ment. Therefore, familiarity with the IATG 
should be increased at an early stage in those 
contexts where national regulations are in-
complete or not yet established.
Matching Needs With Resources
In the last decade, countries that are considered at risk 
have increasingly benefitted from international assistance. 
Assistance has been provided through multiple channels and 
by an array of governments and other actors, sometimes re-
sulting in duplication of efforts, lack of coordination, and 
ensuing inefficiencies. The various coordination mecha-
nisms have largely not kept up with the speed at which sup-
port has grown. This is compounded by the difficulty to fully 
grasp the magnitude, modalities, and destinations of assis-
tance globally; mapping the available technical expertise in 
this field, taking into consideration regional and language 
needs, and then matching it with the needs at a national lev-
el. Furthermore, many governments may not yet be fully fa-
miliar with the IATG as an international baseline for good 
practice. This knowledge gap risks thwarting a wider donor 
GICHD Ammunition Safety Management training, Switzerland, 2015.
Image courtesy of GICHD.
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involvement in SSMA and continues to impinge on the effec-
tiveness of matching resources, needs, and expertise. The con-
duct of the comprehensive survey of assistance provided and 
expertise available, the review of national reports submitted 
pursuant to the U.N. Programme of Action on the illicit trade 
in SA/LW and requests for assistance contained therein, and 
the fostering of knowledge and use of existing good-practice 
tools under the U.N. Saferguard Programme could help tran-
scend that gap.
Accelerated IATG rollout, establishment of national regula-
tory and strategic frameworks, and enhanced international 
cooperation may not sound particularly revolutionary as pos-
sible solutions; however, they remain essential components of 
effective and sustainable SSMA efforts. There is significant po-
tential to promote more structured in-country coordination 
to overcome the often-fragmented responses, with the nation-
al counterpart in the driving seat. Similarly, where strong re-
gional leadership is in place, regional mechanisms should be 
strengthened to better respond to and act on requests, includ-
ing by developing and availing local training capacities. The 
A.U.-Germany coordination platform for the Greater Sahel is 
a useful example in this regard. At the international level, an 
effective multilateral forum for donor coordination could also 
be beneficial. 
Conclusion
SSMA is becoming a key consideration of the internation-
al community at various levels, from the normative to the 
technical. International support has stepped up to strength-
en national efforts. These are highly positive developments 
in recent years. However, major bottlenecks persist, particu-
larly in view of more effective and sustainable SSMA. Greater 
awareness around the risks stemming from inadequate am-
munition management should be a priority, along with 
communicating available expertise and instilling nation-
al responsibility in risk-mitigation measures. Additionally, 
more efforts are needed to move away from ad hoc and short-
term responses toward sustained efforts in building nation-
al capacities, designing laws, standards and roadmaps, and 
seeking systemic improvements. In parallel, international 
cooperation and assistance must be coordinated and allocat-
ed more effectively. 
The GICHD and the United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs (UNODA) have deepened their collaboration and con-
tinue to work to address these gaps jointly with their partners, 
in line with the spirit of partnership called for by the U.N. 
Secretary-General’s new Disarmament Agenda.24 
In particular, the GICHD and UNODA collaborate closely 
on operationalizing the U.N. Saferguard Programme, from es-
tablishing a truly global roster of expertise to the further up-
dating of the guidelines and making them more accessible. In 
light of the challenges ahead, many SSMA stakeholders, from 
donor and at-risk countries to implementing partners, are re-
solved to scale up their engagement. Deepening commitment 
and expanding activities are promising developments toward 
the safe and secure management of ammunition. 
See endnotes page 61
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Shattered Lives and Bodies: 
Recovery of Survivors of Improvised 
Explosive Devices and Explosive 
Remnants of War in Northeast Syria
by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
In northeast Syria, fighting, airstrikes, and artillery shell-ing have led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians from the cities of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, as 
well as rural areas along the eastern bank of the Euphrates 
River. Now that active fighting has moved toward the Syrian-
Iraqi border, the population is beginning to return home. 
However, explosive remnants of war (ERW), improvised ex-
plosive devices (IED), and booby traps (remaining from con-
flict or planted purposefully in homes) continue to put the 
returning population at immense risk and further obstruct 
vital humanitarian access.
From November 2017 to May 2018, Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF) treated more than 150 patients injured by ERW and 
IEDs, nearly one patient every day. There was a peak of 39 cases 
in December and 41 in January, correlating with the return of 
populations from displacement camps in the region. Seventy-
five percent of those patients came from the Deir ez-Zor gov-
ernorate, mostly from Abu Hamam and Dhiban in Mayadin 
district but also from Hajin in Abu Kamal district. Half of the 
patients were children. The victims were those with the means 
or necessary support to survive the journey’s various obsta-
cles and checkpoints. The 60 minutes after a traumatic inju-
ry (sometimes referred to as the golden hour) is a window of 
time in which the patient is thought to have the greatest chance 
of survival provided they receive adequate medical attention. 
One of the major issues for the context of Deir ez-Zor is the 
increasing difficulty to provide care within this timeframe, 
as medical assistance and the most basic health services are 
currently widely restricted across the governorate. An MSF 
surgeon explained that, “Only those patients with less severe 
prognoses manage to come to us, the rest die.” 
Nizar, 14-years-old, was riding a motorcycle in Deir ez-
Zor with his friend Hayyan.1 Near Al-Mayadin bridge, some 
children were playing when one of them took an object from 
the ground and threw it. They did not know it was a mine. It 
exploded immediately. Two of the children died. “I felt noth-
ing,” said Nizar, but he was bleeding profusely and had a frac-
tured leg, shrapnel throughout his body, and multiple cuts. 
His uncle, Khalif, explained what happened: “We took the 
boy to Hakel Alomar camp, but there was no medical point 
there so we went to Dhiban hospital. Health services there 
were not functioning properly either with only two nurses. 
They needed gauzes, which I had to buy myself for 1,500 SYP 
in a pharmacy. After that we tried in Bussera, where a doc-
tor put him on an IV. In Shadade they could not treat him 
because they lacked capacity to deal with that kind of injury. 
In another medical structure they refused to treat him be-
cause our car plate was from Deir ez-Zor. We went to another 
camp then, where they cleaned the wounds, wrapped the in-
jury in some bandages and requested an ambulance that fi-
nally brought us here to the hospital.”
For the victims and their relatives, reaching the health 
structure is only the first stage of a longer journey toward a 
complex and uncertain recovery. If a patient survives, they 
will need long rehabilitation, physical therapy, and psychoso-
cial support. Some will suffer lifelong consequences requiring 
specific support. 
Patients usually arrive at the MSF-supported facility by am-
bulances or in private cars, sometimes having already been sta-
bilized at a field or private hospital, usually where basic care is 
provided before referring the patient to another facility. Often, 
the treatment in those facilities is insufficient due to limited sur-
gical and wound-management capacity, and a lack of postopera-
tive care or appropriate infection control measures. Moreover, 
availability of equipment, capacity, or conflicting priorities also 
limit their services and level of attention given to the patients.
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Figure 1. Deir ez-Zor. 
Figure courtesy of MSF.
“Ayla was going to fetch water from the river with my daugh-
ter and other children. She then stepped on a land-mine. ‘My 
foot! My foot! My foot!’ they told me she screamed. Bleeding, 
crying… It was terrible for her. She didn’t faint, so she was ful-
ly aware of everything and is now worried that she will not be 
able to walk again, that her friends have two feet and she will 
not have one anymore.” At the time of the interview, Ayla was 
receiving treatment in the intensive care unit and about to en-
ter the operating theatre for an amputation of her leg at the 
knee. According to the MSF surgeon, if the tourniquet that ini-
tially was applied had been removed earlier, it would have been 
possible to save more of her limb.
Patients are then directly admitted to triage and the emer-
gency room, where their status is assessed according to the 
severity of trauma they suffer. Green for minor injuries, yel-
low for semi-critical injuries, and red for severe and immedi-
ately life-threatening injuries. One percent of patients receive 
red status, which usually means multiple traumas, as is often 
the case with explosion-related injuries. The first steps are to 
control any hemorrhaging, keep the patients still if they have 
open fractures, and provide blood transfusions to compensate 
for the loss of blood, which poses further challenges in conflict 
zones because of the shortage of available blood. It is a very 
resource-demanding process, as it takes significant time and 
personnel, especially when several people have been wounded 
in the same explosion. 
Everyone is involved, from doctors and nurses to 
laboratory specialists, surgeons, and anesthetists. Special 
equipment is also needed such as tourniquets to stop the bleed-
ing and splints for broken bones. The surgical team then assess 
who will require surgery first and what is needed, as each case 
often requires multiple types of surgery depending on injuries: 
abdominal, shrapnel extraction, amputation, internal bleed-
ing, or burns. Conservative surgery is performed when possi-
ble but in most cases amputation is decided from the onset for 
these types of wounds. 
With ERW and IEDs, the pattern of injuries and devastation 
observed varies according to the type of device, the amount of 
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explosive, and the situation. Effects are always substantial con-
sidering the velocity of the projectiles, the accompanying high 
temperatures, and the extremely violent shocks. From a surgi-
cal point of view, there are usually three types of patterns ob-
served with IED/ERW injuries, which are linked to how the 
incident happened.
Firstly, when a victim steps on a mine, this primarily af-
fects the feet, perineum, scrotum, and waist. Secondly, 
when a victim is exposed to a fragmentation explosion such 
as a landmine or an anti-tank mine, different kinds of high 
velocity shrapnel may affect the body, often requiring intra- 
abdominal exploration for bowel injuries. Finally, when 
the victim picks up the explosive device, it can wound and 
maim fingers, hands, and arms as well as the head. This of-
ten happens with children who are naturally curious and 
tend to be more affected by this type of pattern. An MSF 
surgeon explains
It takes a lot of time and a lot of patience. We are 
able to manage main injuries, but cannot do every-
thing ideally required such as neurosurgery, advanced 
chest surgery, perforated eardrums or eye opera-
tions (although with shrapnel, eyes are often affected 
and end up being lost). There is a big gap in special-
ists. Often, you can save a patient with good post- 
operative management, with a full-fledged intensive 
care unit but in war zones it is often not possible. We 
do the maximum with the minimum.
When patients affected by explosions come out of surgery 
and are moved into the inpatient department, there is always 
an initial chaos for a few minutes. Relatives are nervous and 
agitated, while patients, especially children, often find them-
selves in a state of shock. The violence, shock, and lack of un-
derstanding of what has happened to the patient produces a 
state of stupefaction. This is an emotional stupor in which the 
patient blocks everything to protect and distance themselves 
from their suffering, to the point that emotions seem almost 
absent. This contrasts with the chaotic atmosphere around 
them, which is disturbing to the patient who has no prep-
aration or time to comprehend what happened to them or 
their limbs. 
Post-surgery, the first phase of the treatment is ensuring 
proximity care, which means closely monitoring patients via 
the continuous presence of caretakers. This is when the under-
standing of what has happened begins to develop and when the 
patient’s status is closely monitored to prevent complications, 
which can include the occurrence of phantom pain, a particu-
larly difficult sensation generated by the remaining nerves of 
the severed limbs that continue to transmit information to the 
body as if the limbs are still present. From time to time, jux-
taposing a mirror in front of the stump as if the limb appears 
whole is used to alleviate suffering. Mirror therapy is simple 
but has positive effects in half of the cases.
Pain management is generally a challenge in itself because 
it is not culturally accepted. We use several scales to under-
stand the pain depending on the age and situation of the 
Child survivor of improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war. 
Image courtesy of Louise Annaud/MSF.
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patient. For children, we have faces that express the levels of 
pain (see Figure 2). 
Patients are then transferred to a hospital ward to continue 
the healing process. Depending on the severity of the case, 
they return to the surgical block every two or three days for 
dressing changes. This is often accompanied by apprehension, 
as memories of the intervention and of the incident reemerge. 
For others, dressing changes are made in the ward with a doc-
tor. Caretakers are involved as early as possible in the patient’s 
recovery and are crucial in preventing further complications 
such as phlebitis (when the veins become inflamed); skin re-
traction, which further impedes movement (when the skin 
is altered through the operation, it retracts in on itself and 
therefore limits movement); bleeding of the wounds; muscle 
Child survivor of improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war. 
Image courtesy of Louise Annaud/MSF.
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loss; and atrophy. They also help the patient with early rising. 
Following surgery, a patient is encouraged to move as soon as 
possible, which improves circulation and healing during the 
recovery period. The risk of additional infections is also very 
present because fragmentations can leave lots of shrapnel in 
the body. Whereas some shards will come out naturally, others 
will need further intervention. 
Figure 2. FLACC scale (Face, Limb, Activity, Cry, Consolability).
Figure courtesy of MSF.
Child survivor of improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war. 
Image courtesy of Louise Annaud/MSF.
The recovery process varies according to the wounds. For 
instance, abdominal wounds can have greater consequenc-
es on diet, food absorption, and also bed rest, more so than 
with limbs. It often means a long healing period because the 
wounds are easily soiled by the content of the bowels. At the 
same time, although orthopedics is much cleaner than ab-
dominal surgery, it has an extremely long rehabilitation and 
Items
Scoring
0 1 2
Face No particular expression or smile Occasional grimace or frown, withdrawn, disinterested
Frequent to constant frown, 
clenched jaw, quivering chin
Legs Normal position or relaxed Uneasy, restless, tense Kicking or legs drawn up
Activity Lying quietly, normal position, moves easily Squirming, shifting back and forth, tense Arched, rigid or jerking
Cry No cry (awake or sleep) Moans or whimpers,  occasional complaint
Crying steadily, screams or sobs, 
frequent complaints
Consolability Content, relaxed Reassured by occasional touching, hugging or being talked to, distractible Difficult to console or comfort
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hospitalization period with long-term effects. If the surgical 
intervention has not taken the orthopedic aspect sufficient-
ly into consideration and failed to create a clean flap to close 
the stump and allow for a prosthetic to be put in place in the 
future, the patient’s best chances of resuming movement are 
sharply reduced.
Little information is available about the levels of ERW and 
IEDs in Deir ez-Zor. However, the number of patients treated 
and the stories they tell suggests a dramatic situation requiring 
an urgent need for a comprehensive mine response. This in-
cludes risk education, victim assistance, and mine clearance in 
order to avoid more preventable deaths, injuries, and psycho-
logical trauma. The situation is also very acute in Raqqa, where 
MSF treated close to 500 victims of ERW and IEDs over the 
same period of time, thanks to the better proximity of stabili-
zation points prior to referrals. Along with the tremendous hu-
manitarian impact these incidents are having on the 
population, the high levels of contamination are also hinder-
ing the arrival of much-needed humanitarian support. The 
scale of the contamination shows that a greater coordinated 
effort is needed from the international community to fund, 
support, and facilitate demining and other mine action activi-
ties in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. 
See endnotes page 62
The author would like to thank colleagues for providing their 
experience and support in writing this article.
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How Iraq Is Changing What 
We Do: Measuring Clearance 
in Urban Environments
by Pehr Lodhammar [ UNMAS ]
Iraq is changing what we think, say, and do about mine ac-tion. The terms, standards, and measurements used by the humanitarian mine action (HMA) community need to be 
revised as Daesh remains a destabilizing influence. While the 
Al Maedam district of Mosul fell to Iraqi Security Forces in a 
‘last battle’ on 10 July 2017, the government declared an offi-
cial end to the conflict in Iraq on 10 December 2017.
Whereas HMA followed the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accords, HMA started in East Mosul while fighter jets were 
still bombing West Mosul. Although defeated, Daesh remains 
active. One year later, the same pop-up tactics used by Daesh 
to harass communities continue with reports of killings, kid-
nappings, and also to disrupt explosive ordnance clearance 
operations, leading to the need for ‘day-of ’ adjustments to 
avoid potential new threats. Regrouping in parts of Kirkuk, 
Daquq, and Hawija, Daesh is now patrolling day and night, 
collecting taxes from locals. 
The distinction for explosive hazard clearance, whether con-
ducted as a peacekeeping or a humanitarian mission, is not 
trivial. When United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
Iraq teams enter communities for the first time, they come as 
unknowns, sometimes seen as extensions of a peacekeeping 
mission or an occupying foreign power. Their first task is to 
overcome suspicion and gain the trust of the local communi-
ty, street-by-street. Relying on community liaison officers flu-
ent in the local language and experienced operators selected 
for their interpersonal skills, teams endure a time-consuming 
but necessary process. However, these efforts yield an impor-
tant return: community sources that provide essential infor-
mation for teams to locate, survey, and assess contaminated 
sites. The second task is to deliver clearance in a timely way so 
that stabilization can happen sooner rather than later.1 
During 2018, funding for the explosive hazard response 
will be focused in the five priority governorates identified 
by the government of Iraq: Ninewa, Kirkuk, Anbar, Salah 
al Din, and Diyala, in addition to the explosive hazard 
activities supporting the five pillars of Iraq’s Recovery and 
Development Framework (RDF), and as documented within 
the Recovery, Resilience Programme (RRP) that were both 
officially launched at the Kuwait conference in February 2018.
Context
Delays work for Daesh while urgency works for an eco-
nomically thriving, politically-stable Iraq and for the Middle 
East region as a whole. Therein lies the strategic, geopoliti-
cal importance of explosive hazard clearance in Iraq today. 
International focus has shifted from the legacy of millions of 
landmines left from the Iran-Iraq War and two Gulf wars, a 
legacy that is now handled exclusively by Iraqi authorities, to 
the one-third of Iraq formerly occupied by Daesh. Roughly 
the equivalent of New York state, this region is home to more 
than 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDP) who still 
live in camps. Clearance contributes to a safe home for all. 
Producing stable communities is arguably the most im-
portant component of a shared Iraqi-international com-
munity soft power strategy to secure economic and social 
recovery.2 Communities depend upon stabilization pro-
grams, all of which cannot begin until explosive hazards 
have been removed. 
Adaptation
Initially, the comprehensive data collection phase that nor-
mally precedes explosive hazard clearance did not happen in 
Iraq for the following reasons: 
1. The urgent need to clear key infrastructure so as to be-
gin stabilization and humanitarian programs shifted 
government priorities.
2. The changing security conditions limited access to cer-
tain areas.
3. The time-consuming procedures for registration 
and accreditation of additional operators limited in- 
country resources.    
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Figure 1. Daesh continue to be a destabilizing force and potential threat to operations.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Aid Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) Media Monitoring Report, June 26, 2018/CISR.
Headlines as reported for 26 June 2018
• Official questions government’s intention to strip militias of arms  
(The Baghdad Post)
• Terrorists linked to kidnapping incident on Kirkuk road arrested (NINA)
• Kurdish citizen killed in Islamic State attack in Kirkuk (Iraqi News)
• Booby-trap found in the district of Hawija (NINA)
• Kurdish official makes serious warnings on IS re-emergence in Khanaqin  
(Bas News)
• IS insurgents raid south of Daquq (Bas News/Iraq TradeLink)
• Two terrorists arrested in Sulaymaniyah (NINA)
• Iraqi security in ongoing operation against Islamic State in Diyala: Local 
politician (Kurdistan 24)
• Diyala Operations Command announced the destruction of the so-called Sharia 
court and Daesh caches in operation to hunt down terrorists  
(NINA/The Baghdad Post)
• Four Islamic State members arrested in joint operation, north of Diyala  
(Iraqi News)
• Ten ISIS guesthouses torched as operation in Hamrin Mountains continues  
(The Baghdad Post)
• Seven IMIS terrorists killed, wounded in ISIS attack in Samarra  
(The Baghdad Post)
• Terrorist infiltrated from Syrian territory into Iraqi territory arrested 
(NINA)
Accordingly, the explosive hazard management community at 
large joined in support, with all operators assigned tasks from 
a common Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) list devel-
oped and managed by Iraqi authorities and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) to coordinate clearance of 
critical infrastructure to be followed by repair and reconstruc-
tion known as stabilization programs. Many teams, including 
those funded by UNMAS, have achieved significant results in 
a relatively short period of time; however, early successes came 
with an indirect cost and a predictable result (see Figure 2).
Without comprehensive data collection as a starting 
point, the extent of contamination one year later remains 
an unknown pending completion of a comprehensive, non- 
technical survey and assessment of the liberated areas. UNMAS 
Iraq will field NTS teams during the latter part of 2018 to con-
duct this survey. Meanwhile, explosive hazard management 
and operations continue on a daily basis (see Figure 2).
The absence of a comprehensive survey to assess and quan-
tify contamination by type meant that UNMAS Iraq teams 
needed to integrate surveys into clearance tasks to record 
concentration, dispersal, location, and type of hazards, so 
that information could be shared with the government of 
Iraq. This has led to a catch-up effort to upload data into a de-
veloping information management system for shared use and 
transfer to Iraq’s Directorate of Mine Action (DMA).  
Unique Environment
In conventional mine action, if operators have access to the 
surface, they most likely have access to the threat. Whether 
arrayed in a pattern to defend a military position or used in 
isolation, landmines typically target personnel or vehicles. 
Their known fit-for-purpose design, properties, and function 
make landmine clearance a surface or near-surface activi-
ty; procedures and standards evolved accordingly. Similarly, 
clearance of known explosive remnants of war (ERW) —e.g., 
large, air-dropped munitions—even when buried or sub-
merged, differs mostly by proximity to the surface. 
In legacy contamination areas, such as along the Iran-Iraq 
border, Iraqi authorities focus conventional clearance meth-
ods on threats posed by unknown amounts of ERW and 
31
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 22.2
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2018
32 SPOTLIGHT @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
In urban environments, the surface may be covered by mas-
sive amounts of debris. Contamination can include a mix of 
ammunition, air-dropped munitions, other ERW, suicide belts 
still attached to human remains, and IEDs placed by Daesh 
forces as they withdrew. An estimated 7 million tons of con-
taminated debris in West Mosul await clearance. While the 
landmines estimated to be in the millions. In liberated ar-
eas of Iraq, the mix of conventional threats with improvised 
explosive devices (IED) adds a three-dimensional aspect to 
clearance since the operator must contend not only with haz-
ards on or below the surface but with IEDs placed in walls, 
ceilings, fixtures, etc. 
During the 12-month period ending June 2018, UNMAS Iraq teams 
assessed and cleared critical sites and conducted training in both 
urban and rural areas.   
• More than 350 explosive devices from 30,000 sq m bordering a power grid 
serving 60,000 people and seven schools near Fallujah.
• Thirty-four IEDs weighing a total of 435 kg from a fuel station in Jadidah—
enough to completely destroy the building, and kill or injure anyone within 
a 100-m radius.
• Forty-four IEDs from under or on the Fallujah ‘New Bridge,’ totaling 380–400 
kg of homemade explosives. UNMAS divers found and safely removed two submerged 
IEDs from Fallujah’s ‘Iron Bridge.’
• Forty-four IEDs, 51 main charges, three items of unexploded ordnance, and 
343 IED component parts from a 37,995 sq m asphalt factory in Fallujah.
• Forty-plus IEDs along a 50-m stretch of road which, due to earth compacted 
by rains, made search-find-remove-and-render-safe extremely hazardous for 
operators.
• From commencement of clearance operations in Mosul’s Old City on 28 November 
2017 through 31 May 2018, UNMAS teams completed 790 tasks resulting in the 
removal of approximately 33,500 explosive hazards, including 610 suicide 
belts.
• In the Al Maedam district alone, 491 explosive hazards, of which 232 were 
suicide belts, and of these, approximately 100 were removed from human 
remains.
• Conducted 70 surveys in Al-Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa governorates in 
support of high priority stabilization and humanitarian interventions.
• Removed 15,700 ERW and 900 IEDs, including 610 suicide belts in liberated 
areas.
• Conducted 750 clearance tasks enabling the UNDP and government to begin 
rehabilitation of critical infrastructures.
• Completed 10 joint assessment missions enabling the United Nations and 
humanitarian partners to deliver aid in liberated areas.
• Trained 170 police officers in first response techniques, including identification, 
marking, and reporting explosive hazards; and 20 U.N. security staff to 
safely respond to IED and explosive-hazard threats.
• Trained 1,600 UNDP cash-for-work employees, 800 government, and 300 U.N./NGO 
staff working in high-risk environments to recognize and behave safely in the 
presence of explosive hazards.
• Conducted risk education sessions attended by 147,000 people in schools, IDP 
camps, and other high-priority areas.
Figure 2. Critical sites cleared.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/CISR.
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presence of IEDs in Mosul varies by district, five of Mosul’s 
eight districts searched through June 2018 yielded 27,000 ex-
plosive hazards. Until battle damaged buildings are searched 
and debris is safely inspected, managed, and removed, 
there is no way to know the extent and level of the three- 
dimensional contamination. 
In rural environments, IEDs arrayed in belts have substitut-
ed for landmines to defend combatant positions during conflict 
and continue to contaminate agricultural land.3 IEDs have also 
been used to deny villagers access to wells, schools, government 
offices, and virtually any other asset essential to livelihood. 
If the HMA community considers the use of IEDs in Iraq as 
a fundamental change to explosive hazard clearance, what is 
a satisfactory term for an acceptable clearance standard for 
this surface-and-above threat? Whether debris from col-
lapsed buildings or the space within a battle-damaged build-
ing, the problem deals with volume and certification, not just 
of cleared land but also of cleared space. The International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) do not have such a reference, 
but if experience in Iraq to date is an indicator of a need for 
similar environments, IMAS may need such a reference 
and the development of a surface-and-above standard. The 
implications of such a standard would seem important for 
the HMA community for certification and for accountabil-
ity purposes.4 
For certification, cleared buildings, debris management, 
and disposal need standards. However, in an environment 
such as Iraq, the community may need to settle for some-
thing less than previously accepted standards. With debris 
and structural assets above ground, what if 100 percent 
clearance is not possible? What level of risk is acceptable? 
Compared to conventional clearance, what are the implica-
tions for time, cost, and the priority of tasks and commit-
ment of resources?
The search conducted at Fallujah’s Iron Bridge may serve 
as a case in point for an honest and open exchange of views. 
The impact of the open bridge measured in socioeconom-
ic terms is arguably the real outcome of clearance and 
should be a measurement of success rather than the linger-
ing perception that the operation cleared only two IEDs for 
Iron Bridge, Fallujah 
Reconstruction suspended in February 2018 due to suspected IEDs at or below 
waterline.
• Total dive time underwater: 17 hours and 53 minutes
• April 8 - Dive team briefed
• April 9 - Dive 1 to check conditions:
 » Water depth at 7.0 meters 
 » Current of 5 to 6 knots
 » Visibility at 3 cm due to the current
 » Divers adjust plan, hold onto the bridge structure continually or be 
swept away from the task, slowing progress
• April 9 - Dive 2 
 » Suspected main charge case was found and photographed 
 » Fingertip search established that no other hazards were present, i.e., 
battery pack detonator or pressure plate
• April 9 - Dive 3, suspected main charge (1) safely recovered
• April 10 - Dive 4, suspected main charge (2) safely recovered
• April 11 - Dives suspended, following holidays, resume 
• April 14 - Dives continue: An AK47 assault rifle was located and recovered
• April 15 - Dives conclude, confirming no further hazards
• Area searched: 900 sq. m. 
• Found:
 » Two IEDs, 20 kg main charge cases, plastic, filled with homemade 
explosives (HME)
 » One AK47 assault rifle
Figure 3. Case study: Iron Bridge, Fallujah.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/CISR.
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a week’s effort. What matters is that the elimination of the 
threat led to the resumption of the rehabilitation work.
If all tasks on the stabilization list are deemed high value and 
there is no way to quantify cost-benefit, they must compete 
with one another on some basis for purposes of priority. But 
what is that basis? Since priority remains a matter for Iraqi au-
thorities to decide, UNMAS Iraq’s best response is to antici-
pate needs and quickly deploy clearance assets in the case of 
Fallujah’s Iron Bridge case study (see Figure 3). 
Eliminate Suspicion
Whether mine action ultimately returns cleared land or 
cleared space to communities, eliminating suspected threats 
and achieving security and safety should be a measure of suc-
cess. Even if nothing is found, the suspicion of IEDs needs to 
be removed before rehabilitation can begin. While the prob-
lem of “who comes first” belongs to the government, the so-
lution is partly a function of the HMA community and its 
ability to mobilize, deploy, and use resources efficiently based 
on an internationally agreed upon common value statement 
or model for determining socioeconomic gains, e.g., clearing 
Fallujah’s Iron Bridge saves the community time and addition-
al fuel costs attributable to detours.
Impact
This value statement should speak to the impact of mine 
action instead of the number of explosive hazards cleared. 
Although UNMAS Iraq teams typically clear enough ex-
plosive hazards in a given week to fill a 20-ft (6-m) contain-
er, such inventories are quantitative measures of explosive 
hazard management, which understate the cost-benefit, value 
-added, and socio-economic outcomes associated with envi-
ronments such as Iraq with its 1.9 million IDPs waiting to 
safely return home.
Consider the lesson learned by the Fallujah Iron Bridge ex-
perience: if the operation were measured in terms of contami-
nation alone, the two IEDs destroyed during the week-long 
effort would seem costly in terms of efforts expended, yet 
more than commensurate when valued by the socio-econom-
ic impact. Effectively, this indicates that the mine action com-
munity should reevaluate its model for measuring outcome 
for nonconventional clearance.
Inevitably, limited resources delay stabilization and hu-
manitarian tasks in post-conflict environments. Similarly, 
UNMAS surveyed and assessed clearance needs for two tex-
tile factories in western Mosul used by Daesh to manufac-
ture ammunition. The buildings were believed hit by two 
500–1000 lb (226.8–453.6 kg) airdrop weapons, one of which 
exploded when delivered.5 Clearance will require inten-
sive manual operations since the building structures could 
be severely damaged by the use of mechanical assets. When 
operational, the factory employs approximately 6,500 staff—
mostly women—producing textiles largely for export.
In rural areas, the devastation may appear less, but the net 
effect is the same: denial of the means of production and loss 
of livelihoods. IEDs arrayed in a traditional minefield pattern 
are known to contaminate some agricultural land; similarly, 
individual IEDs contaminate key infrastructure, such as the 
village well in Al Bokald near West Mosul. 
Figure 4. Case study: Al-Shifa Hospital, Al Maedam district, West Mosul.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/CISR.
Al-Shifa Hospital, Al Maedam district
• Used by Daesh as a treatment center and for ammunition and IED manufacturing
• August–September 2017: Phase 1 clearance of accessible areas: 653 explosive 
hazards and 10 kg of IEDs removed
• April 2018: Phase 2 clearance of previously inaccessible areas begins using 
newly arrived armored heavy equipment and manual methods to remove
 » 4 kg of improvised explosives
 » 85 explosive hazards
 » 48 small arms ammunition (SAA)
 » 12,350 kg of de-bulleted SAA (Daesh propellant harvesting)
 » 29,945 m3 of rubble and debris
• May 2018: Clearance complete
• June 2018: Site reverts to UNDP and reconstruction begins
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Following clearance, the now-repaired Al Qasoor 
Water Treatment Plant in East Mosul again supplies 
clean and safe water to more than 300,000 people 
across 34 service areas. In Ninewa province, follow-
ing clearance, the land registry office offers access 
deeds to validate land claims of residents seeking re-
turn. Following clearance of the fuel station in Al 
Jadidah, 20 employees pump fuel for more than 300 
vehicles daily after a three-year hiatus. Following 
clearance and repairs to the Fallujah Iron Bridge, 
travel time for some residents to the only maternity 
hospital in a 50 km (31.1 mi) radius will be reduced 
from two hours to five minutes. Moreover, the as-
phalt factory reopened after four years and will em-
ploy 65 workers when operating at full capacity.
Difficult Choices
Looking back with perfect hindsight does not solve the 
problem for government decision makers responsible for 
determining task priority. The model to predict socio- 
economic benefits is not new but the application of such 
thinking to mine action probably is.6 The problem comes 
with the value judgment made between a large workforce 
employed by the Mosul textile factory previously mentioned 
and a small agricultural community dependent upon land 
contaminated with an IED belt. While the decision on where 
to prioritize clearance does not belong to the HMA com-
munity, standardizing the mine action variables involved in 
efficiently delivering clearance can influence this decision be-
ginning with operational and security reasons. The anticipa-
tion of needs, operational flexibility, and response is key for 
the HMA community. However, in terms of clearance, Iraq’s 
working environment is unique in a number of ways: 
• Narrow, cluttered streets increase clearance time in ur-
ban environments, whereas relatively open spaces in 
some outlying neighborhoods and rural areas may take 
less time.
• Travel time to and from sites and checkpoints effective-
ly limit teams’ access to sites. For example, there are 14 
checkpoints between the UNMAS Iraq base in Erbil and 
contamination sites in Betu, Kirkuk, and Naweji, exten-
sively reducing clearance time to half a day of work.
• Heavy contamination linked to human remains causes 
a stop-start-stop sequence to clearance, whether manual 
or mechanical. Mechanical operations stop-start-stop for 
each new discovery to allow government authorities to re-
cover, identify, and return the remains for a proper burial.
• Deteriorating security conditions influence operations. 
Clearance teams use diversionary routes to avoid pre-
dictability, adding time to mission planning and execu-
tion. Armored vehicles located close to operations may 
limit access to certain areas entirely.
• Specialized and highly-trained operators, as with the 
Fallujah Iron Bridge divers who deployed in record 
time, may lead to the government reprioritizing clear-
ance based on asset availability.
Quality Assurance
Complexity of design, manufacture, and quantity of IEDs 
creates a mix of threats and a unique operating environment 
for clearance teams in Iraq. IEDs vary significantly by manu-
facturing methods. IEDs have been found in artificial rocks, in 
air conditioning units, and under hanging garments triggered 
by an infrared device. Components can include repurposed 
common objects such as plastic tubing, washing machine 
timers, and syringes. In one of two bomb factories located 
within the Al-Shifa Hospital complex, UNMAS teams found 
more than 150,000 electronic components intended for use in 
IED manufacture (see Figure 4).
The combination of scarce resources and/or inadequate 
clearance, as well as IDPs eager to return home inevitably lead 
to cleared areas being recontaminated. For example, when re-
turnees collect explosive hazards from their land and homes 
and deposit these in an already cleared street, this leads to re-
contamination and creates problems in terms of mapping, re-
cording, and managing data. 
Although Daesh officially has been defeated, daily security 
reports confirm what UNMAS Iraq teams know from experi-
ence in the field: Daesh remains an active if sporadic threat, 
often returning to recontaminate cleared areas.7 
Al-Shifa Hospital: before and after.
Image courtesy of Google Earth.
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Al-Shifa Hospital: armored heavy equipment operations.
Image courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/George Tan.
Aerial view of Al-Shifa Hospital.
Image courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/George Tan.
Al-Shifa Hospital interior.
Image courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq/George Tan.
Observations
Convention. Iraq’s National Strategic and Executive Plan for 
Mine Action 2017–2021 outlines Iraq’s commitment to work 
toward a safe environment free from explosive hazards, desig-
nating the DMA as the national authority for explosive hazard 
management charged with the responsibility to survey, mark, 
and render safe 50 percent of known contamination by 2021. 
Iraq’s commitment to the National Strategic and Executive 
Plan currently covers only landmines and ERW, not IEDs.
Outcomes. UNMAS Iraq reports explosive hazard 
management results in terms of square meters and items 
cleared on a monthly basis; however, without an accompany-
ing narrative, numbers can understate the complexity of the 
situation. Planning is integral for both mine action profes-
sionals and those agencies responsible for stabilization and 
humanitarian tasks.
Priorities. Should we clear rural communities last be-
cause urban populations are larger? Do the 50 families in 
Al Bokald matter any less than the 6,500 workers waiting 
to return to their jobs in the textile factory? Government 
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Euphrates Rive with near zero visibility.
Image courtesy of Wtorplast.
Divers at the Iron Bridge in Fallujah. 
Image courtesy of Wtorplast.
authorities could benefit from a system that measures an 
economic and/or social return and avoids perceptions of 
political, ethnic, or other arbitrary inf luences when setting 
priorities. The HMA community can assist decision makers 
with this responsibility by efficiently managing and deploy-
ing assets and managing conditions that reduce task times 
while meeting quality standards. 
Assessment. How might government authorities assure 
themselves and donor organizations of maintaining capaci-
ty once it is enhanced? One idea the mine action community 
might adopt is to formally recognize the need to recertify staff 
based on peer reviews or skill audits conducted by a profes-
sional board or regulatory authority as commonly practiced 
by other professions. Organizations and individuals would 
need to meet standards and demonsrate proficiency in man-
aging information and conducting surveys as well as generat-
ing, monitoring, and closing tasks.
Costs. Although explosive hazard clearance precedes stabi-
lization and humanitarian tasks, the HMA community has 
yet to recognize high-value clearance, as illustrated by the 
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Iron Bridge, Fallujah.
Image courtesy of United Nations Mine Action Service.
Fallujah Iron Bridge or scenarios involving long-distance 
travel, high-threat environments, physical constraints such as 
heavy debris, collapsed buildings, or limited access to infra-
structure, all of which add to costs. For many, the convention-
al thinking and measures regarding cost date from battle area 
clearance or legacy mine fields where experience says clear-
ance can cost as little as US$3.50 for one meter cubed (one 
square meter to a depth of one meter). The HMA community 
needs to develop and refine appropriate benchmarks as a basis 
for value statements consistent with clearance costs related to 
stabilization and humanitarian returns. 
Disposal. Although the Iraqi government understandably 
restricts exclusive use of explosives to Iraqi Security Forces, 
this procedure demands the secure and timely transportation 
of explosive hazards to secure sites for safe disposal to avoid 
potential buildups of large amounts of explosive hazards. A 
handover methodology and a certification procedure could 
leverage available international organization expertise to in-
clude destruction after rendering safe, removal, and collec-
tion of explosive hazards, thereby maintaining accountability 
while alleviating a potential delay.
Knowledge management. IED removal is predicated on 
problem-solving skills and understanding how the devices 
function so as to identify the different components. How 
IEDs are manufactured, function, IED composition vari-
ety, and knowing what to look for before going into the 
field have become daily tasks for operators and caused 
UNMAS Iraq to re-invent its information/knowledge 
management capabilities.   
Community. UNMAS Iraq has relied extensively on com-
munity liaison officers to help establish trust with the local 
community to gather information regarding possible IED 
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locations and areas to avoid should Daesh have a presence. 
Casual cash-for-work cadres when trained have proven suc-
cessful as a multiplier for areas thought to be cleared when 
paired with other UNMAS clearance teams. Cash-for-work 
workers are hired as casual laborers to remove debris in de-
stroyed neighborhoods in Mosul and elsewhere. While they 
are hired only to remove and clear debris, they are given risk 
education to be able to identify, report, and warn of explosive 
hazards. By doing this, local citizens identify and report on 
potential hazards. 
See endnotes page 62
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Field Notes
Sepon Supports UXO Clearance 
in Laos
by Saman Aneka and Michael Valent  [ MMG LXML Sepon ]
Sepon mine, owned by the largest international min-ing company in Laos, MMG Lane Xang Minerals Limited Sepon (LXML), is situated in a remote area 
of Vilabouly District, Savannakhet Province—one of the most 
bombed districts in Lao PDR. Over 21,000 people have been 
killed or injured as a result of unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
accidents in the post-war period (1974–2018), of which 25 per-
cent were in Savannakhet Province.1 This legacy brings unique 
challenges to mining operations, development projects, and 
agricultural production.
LXML has integrated UXO clearance as an essential activity 
in its mining cycle. This ensures employees and communities 
are safe and will sustain a lasting legacy for agricultural activ-
ity in the future. Additionally, LXML has invested in software 
and hardware via strategic partnerships to enhance technical 
capacity and improve clearance practices in Laos.
LXML UXO technicians use the UltraTEM to detect items of UXO up to 3.5 m (3.8 yd) deep at Sepon mine.
Image courtesy of MMG.
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UXO Work in Numbers
Since 1996, LXML has invested over US$45 million in UXO 
activities, clearing around 2,900 ha (7,166.1 ac) of land and 
destroying over 58,000 UXO items. Up to 80 percent of the 
125,000 ha (308,881.7 ac) of concessional land granted to 
LXML by the Lao government was heavily bombed during 
the Indochina War as part of the logistics route known as the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail.2
In Sepon, UXO clearance is conducted before exploration, 
mining, civil engineering, and to support projects and local 
villages’ activities surrounding the mine and archaeological 
site areas.3 In the 1990s, UXO clearance was conducted before 
exploration and local roads and tracks were cleared and en-
larged during the exploration phase, allowing the local pop-
ulation safer and better access to rice fields and plantations.
UXO clearance before civil engineering, such as the rehabili-
tation of Road 28A—a main transport route linking Vilabouly 
with Road 9 (Savannakhet Province’s main east-west high-
way)—involved a shallow search to a depth of 25 cm (9.8 in) 
followed by a deep search to a depth of 250 cm (98.4 in) along 
the entire stretch.4 Thousands of submunitions, bombs, rock-
ets, and other ammunitions were cleared, allowing safer road 
access for the Vilabouly community.
In partnership with Sunlabob Renewable Energy, LMXL 
supported development projects and provided safe, sustain-
able water supplies to villages in Vilabouly by using solar-
powered pumps to draw water from unusually deep bore 
holes, which were not amenable to using hand pumps.5 This 
project resulted in UXO clearance for the twelve targeted vil-
lages comprising almost 3,400 community members.6
The Mandarin Project, a partnership with Australian com-
pany Ironbark Citrus, created an avenue for Lao farmers to 
move from subsistence to commercial agriculture by enabling 
smallholder families to grow mandarin oranges using best 
practices and current technology.7 Before any planting could 
commence, land areas were cleared from UXO. To date, bene-
ficiaries of the project have planted mandarins covering near-
ly 22 ha (54.4 ac) of land.
 
Software: Enhancing Capacity and Leveling 
to International Standards
LXML and the Lao Ministry of Defence’s Engineering 
Department signed a memorandum of understanding in 
mid-2013 in a joint effort to clear UXO within Sepon Mine, 
including the site of the mine as well as potential areas for ex-
ploration and mining activities. LXML received full National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA) accreditation to conduct UXO 
clearance within its vicinity.
Building on this framework, LXML partnered with 
the Lao Ministry of Defence, the National Regulatory 
Authority (NRA), and Lao National Unexploded Ordnance 
Programme (UXO Lao) to improve UXO clearance stan-
dards in Laos by enhancing the capacity of Lao UXO tech-
nicians. The accredited explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
training programs were developed in cooperation with the 
NRA to provide recognized qualifications and experience in 
UXO clearance techniques.
In 2016, LXML founded, hosted, organized, and managed 
the 5th NRA Senior Explosive Ordnance Disposal (SEOD) 
course to build capacity for Lao Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) technicians. The EOD training materials provided by 
LXML are systematically sent to NRA for quality assurance 
and to ensure they align with NRA standards and the battle-
field clearance operator (BCO) EOD levels 1, 2, and 3, as well 
as SEOD, the in-country EOD level 4 qualifications.
In 2016, 35 LXML employees successfully completed the 
EOD levels 1 and 2, increasing the number of qualified Lao 
personnel capable of supporting UXO operations. A further 
nine employees completed the pathfinder training, an in-
house training to those who have completed and qualified for 
EOD level 1. The pathfinders are trained to accompany non-
EOD LXML technicians (geologists, environmentalists, and 
community-relations employees) to work areas that have not 
been cleared and may potentially contain UXO. Pathfinders 
use a basic metal detector to find the safest path for people 
they accompany. Pathfinders’ roles are to detect and mark 
UXO, not to excavate UXO. Instead, they will mark each 
contact found or spotted item of UXO from a safe distance and 
guide their group safely around the hazards. The qualified em-
ployees who completed the above training are now working in 
survey or geology and continue to support LXML’s UXO and 
other operations.
Hardware: Increasing Speed and Accuracy of 
Detection
LXML continues to investigate and invest in technology to 
improve target detection and identification. It has developed 
advanced geophysical gravitational and electromagnetic sur-
vey methods to deliver productive clearing activities to sup-
port operations, particularly open pit mining. In 2015, LXML 
introduced new equipment to enhance UXO detection. The 
UltraTEM II Deep Bomb Detection System was developed by 
Australia’s Gap Explosive Ordnance Detection (GapEOD) in 
close coordination with LXML geophysicists.
UltraTEM is a time domain, electromagnetic system us-
ing multiple three-component sensors on a mobile frame.8 
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The system provides high-definition mapping of buried 
UXO, accurate estimates of position and depth, and pro-
duces a digital recording. The stored digital recording 
can be further analyzed and calibrated with results in the 
field. UltraTEM can detect UXO in a single pass in a range 
of background conditions that proved difficult for other 
equipment, increasing both speed and reliability. The sys-
tem is capable of detecting Mk 81 aerial bombs at depths of 
up to 5 m (5.5 yd) in good geophysical ground conditions, 
although the operational target is a clearance depth of 3.5 m 
(3.8 yd). In areas where the geophysical ground conditions 
are poor, based on the quality of the data and operating ex-
perience, the detection depth is reduced by up to 50 percent. 
The UltraTEM loop is powered by a low noise generator and 
signal generator mounted on a support truck, allowing for 
the unit to be easily relocated.
The UltraTEM is maintained by a team of five operators un-
der the supervision of a specially trained Lao EOD level 3 
supervisor. The supervisors send data collected for interpre-
tation. Data is then sent back with a list of potential UXO that 
need to be investigated. The system has proven robust and re-
liable in the field with electrical connectors requiring checks 
and maintenance for operation.
LXML has a strong commitment to ongoing improvements 
and has fully supported these activities by participating in 
standardization and field trials. The company’s experience 
A female UXO technician, accounting for eight percent of the workforce, of which 80 percent are local Vilabouly residents, uses a 
metal detector to locate UXO at Sepon. 
Image courtesy of MMG.
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is shared with the local and international UXO clearance 
community working in Laos.9 LXML attends the NRA UXO 
Technical Working Group that meets every three months 
in Vientiane. The activities undertaken by the attendees is 
shared openly at this forum.
Additionally, LXML held a detection trial at Sepon in late 
2014 to assess the suitability and cost effectiveness of advanced 
ordnance detection systems for small ordnance. Using blind 
seed (i.e., free from explosive (FFE) inert material) test sites, 
a number of advanced systems were compared with each oth-
er as well as with systems that were currently in use. Multiple 
systems were considered to be viable UXO detection systems, 
but the trial highlighted the importance of accreditation, 
operational standards, and quality management processes. 
The organizations that were involved included the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 
LXML, UXO Lao, and NRA.
Assurance: Maintaining the Quality of UXO 
Clearance
Throughout 2017, LXML reinforced quality management via 
UXO blind seed, which was planted in the ground to be de-
tected and cleared. This ensures UXO teams are consistently 
achieving and delivering high-quality clearance for the benefit 
and safety of mining operations and surrounding communi-
ties. LXML’s UXO quality management coordinator plants a 
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number of blind seeds, which consist of one-half of a FFE BLU 
26 (a single shell of a cluster bomblet BLU 26), at the UXO 
clearance sites planned for the day. The ratio is a minimum of 
one blind seed for every twelve detectors working that day, i.e., 
additional blind seeds being planted for each additional set of 
twelve detectors. Blind seed positions are recorded by GPS 
and are entered and overlaid by the Lao National Geographic 
Department’s Graphical Information System (GIS). The blind 
seeds are monitored every day by the GIS when entering the 
daily work record in the system. Any blind seed remaining 
and appearing in shallow, cleared-area maps would imme-
diately alert the UXO coordinator of a deficiency and would 
initiate an investigation and preventive action. The daily 
clearance record by operators and site supervisors also iden-
tifies the operator that cleared the lane where the UXO was 
missed and where EOD level 2 and 3 supervisors conducted 
their quality check. 
Blind seed FFE Mk 81 250 lb (113.4 kg) UXO were also placed 
regularly throughout the year in different mine pits to main-
tain assurance of the quality of the geophysical digital data 
collected by UXO teams in the field and the quality of the geo-
physicist’s interpretation. Random dataset samples were reg-
ularly sent to a third party for independent verification and 
review, with both parties of geophysicists (independent and 
LXML) critiquing the results.
With a single international EOD expert remaining in the 
LXML UXO team at Sepon since 2016, the newly qualified 
SEOD national employees (EOD level 4 qualification) now 
take a larger role to ensure compliance with NRA standards 
and to maintain a safe and professional approach. SEODs are 
now more involved in the NRA technical working group and 
LXML SEODs are in charge of planning and coordinating 
UXO field operations. This experience will enhance capacity 
in future.
A BLU 17/B found in Sepon mine that contains white phosphorus that burns instantly when in contact with oxygen. It can create hor-
rific injuries and its smoke is extremely harmful. 
Image courtesy of MMG and Yvon Le Chevanton.
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Saman Aneka is Managing Director and 
Stakeholder Relations Manager at LXML, 
and Vice President to the Advisory 
Board of the Lao National Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. He currently 
provides strategic guidance to the LXML 
Board as Managing Director and leads the 
Stakeholder Relations function. Aneka has 
over thirty years of experience in the mining industry, locally and 
internationally. He has extensive field experience in Australia, 
China, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, and Thailand. 
With his expertise, Aneka was involved in the early days and in-
ception of LXML. He has extensive institutional knowledge of the 
company and industry in Lao PDR. Aneka holds a master’s degree 
in hard rock geo-mineral exploration.
Michael Valent
Mine Technical Services Manager
MMG LXML Sepon
Michael Valent is Manager of Mine Technical 
Services at LXML. He holds a Bachelor of 
Engineering (Mining) and an Executive 
Masters of Business Administration. 
Michael has over 35 years’ experience in 
the mining industry. He has extensive risk 
management experience and has worked 
with high-hazard environments such as 
open pit mining in and around underground voids and with the 
LXML operations, open pit mining, and clearing in land contami-
nated with UXO. Michael enjoys building the capability and ac-
countability of the technical functions and operations personnel 
to support safe and productive mining that continuously improves.
Saman Aneka
Managing Director and Stakeholder Relations Manager
MMG LXML Sepon
Harnessing UXO Knowledge: Saving our People 
and Communities
LXML achieved zero UXO-related incidents within its clear-
ance team and consistently champion one of LXML’s core 
values: Think Safety First regarding the unique hazards asso-
ciated with UXO clearance.10 In 2017, fifty LXML employees 
and contractors joined hands for an UXO awareness day. The 
purpose was to raise awareness around UXO hazards.
LXML also provides financial support to the Cooperative 
Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) in Vientiane in its 
awareness raising activities. COPE was established by the Lao 
Ministry of Health in 1997 to ensure that people with phys-
ical disabilities have local access to affordable, nationally- 
managed rehabilitation services. In 2008, COPE opened its 
visitor center to increase awareness about disabilities in Laos 
and highlight the work to help people with mobility-related 
disabilities lead full and productive lives with access to qual-
ity prosthetics. Throughout its history, COPE has provided 
comprehensive support for the government of Laos’ mobility-
related rehabilitation efforts. COPE services are also used for 
amputees in road accidents and other trauma.
In Laos, LXML is supporting development and is keeping 
people safe by enhancing capacity, investing in modern tech-
nology, and raising awareness of UXO through active part-
nerships with key players in the UXO sector. 
See endnotes page 62
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THE HYBRID THERMAL LANCE: A PROMISING 
NEW TECHNIQUE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF 
LANDMINES AND UXO BY DEFLAGRATION
by Donald Pratt [ Messiah College ] and Nicolas Torbet [ The HALO Trust ]
Explosive ordnance can be destroyed by a variety of meth-ods. Destruction in-situ using an explosive charge is generally the preferred means; it is reliable, technically 
straightforward, and often the safest option. Other techniques 
include thermite-based tools or low-explosive powered disrup-
tors. However, in a number of current humanitarian mine ac-
tion (HMA) operating environments, clearance organizations 
are faced with restrictions on explosive use and/or importation of 
other energetic materials such as thermite. This may be due to the 
legitimate security concerns of mine-affected states, or legislative 
frameworks that do not account for non-military use of explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) tools. This takes place against a broad-
ening range of explosive ordnance, particularly given the prolif-
eration of improvised explosive based hazards in the Middle East.1
This article presents an alternative method for destroying land-
mines and other thin-cased ordnance by burning through the 
case and deflagrating the explosive inside so that it is consumed 
without detonating. The device, referred to herein as the Hybrid 
Thermal Lance (HTL), is made from low-cost parts readily avail-
able in almost all countries, none of which are prohibited from 
carry-on baggage or likely to be subject to dual-use import restric-
tions. Single-use fuel tubes and locally-sourced gaseous oxygen 
make the HTL simple and inexpensive to use. While at a relatively 
early stage of testing, the authors felt sharing the results thus far 
(and making the concept open-source) would best meet the urgent 
needs of the HMA community, allowing other individuals or or-
ganizations to develop the concept further as they see fit.
Following a meeting in Cambodia between Donald Pratt and 
staff from The HALO Trust, there developed a research and de-
velopment partnership between HALO and the Messiah College 
Collaboratory for Strategic Partnerships and Applied Research. 
The Collaboratory is an interdisciplinary undergraduate research 
initiative of Messiah College that connects students and faculty 
mentors from many different disciplines with real-world projects 
involving clients from around the world. HALO’s need for a meth-
od to destroy ordnance in locations where explosives are highly 
regulated prompted an investigation into the idea that a modified 
hybrid rocket motor might be a suitable solution.
SIMILAR METHODS FOR THE DISPOSAL OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
Techniques using heat to enable the disposal of explosive 
ordnance are well established.2 They are often employed as they 
can allow for mass disposal of ordnance, with a significantly re-
duced chance of a high-order explosion, or as an alternative to 
explosives where licensing issues do not permit the use of high 
explosives:
◊ Thermite EOD tools. Thermite is an energetic material 
composition in which a metal-based powder, incorporating 
a fuel and an oxidizer, upon ignition undergoes an exother-
mic process producing significant amounts of heat in a fo-
cused area for short periods. For EOD purposes, aluminum 
powder is commonly used as the base fuel and, along with 
an oxidant mix, is initiated electrically using a magnesium-
based (or similar) ignitor. The heat is focused onto the ord-
nance by either a crucible, flare, or direct placement system. 
Producing a high-quality thermite delivery system is rela-
tively challenging, but a number of commercial products are 
available and have been employed by the HMA community 
with some notable successes. However, thermite-based EOD 
tools are often subject to licensing and import restrictions 
as, while comparatively safe to transport, they are consid-
ered to have potential military applications.3 Moreover, the 
price per demolition is often relatively high.
◊ Gas-combination torches. Torches that combine oxygen 
with liquid gas (or other similar fuel) have also been devel-
oped. These tools use principles similar to oxy-fuel welding/
cutting torches to produce focused heat and flame. These 
have often been found to be overly complex to set up and 
challenging to reliably deploy in the field.
◊ Incinerators and open-pit burning. Although general-
ly used for different purposes, this technique is mentioned 
for completeness. Large quantities of unfuzed, safe-to-move 
munitions can be destroyed using incinerators or burning 
of stacks in the open. In this case, wooden fuel is normally 
stacked among or under the munitions and ignited, often 
supplemented by a diesel mixture. This has the benefit of 
disposing of large quantities of munitions over time without 
detonating them. Disposing of mines or fuzed munitions 
using this technique is normally impractical or unsafe, al-
though grill burners have been used successfully to destroy 
smaller anti-personnel mines in some instances.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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CHARACTERISTICS OF HYBRID ROCKET MOTORS
Hybrid rocket motors, consisting of a solid-fuel and liquid or gas-
eous oxidizer, have been around for a long time. Figure 1 shows the 
basic components of a typical hybrid rocket motor. A recent nota-
ble example is the liquid nitrous oxide/hydroxyl-terminated poly-
butadiene (a type of polyurethane elastomer) motor used in the 
suborbital Space Ship One developed by Mojave Space Ventures, 
which won the X-Prize in 2004. In contrast to solid rocket mo-
tors, having the oxidizer in liquid or gaseous form allows the re-
action to be throttled, stopped, and restarted easily, without the 
complexity of mixing and metering required of rockets using liq-
uid/gas fuel and liquid/gas oxidizer. Hybrid rocket motors are also 
safer than solid rocket motors, since mixing of the fuel and oxi-
dizer in a hybrid does not take place until the point of combustion. 
In addition, many different types of materials can make effective 
fuels, including commonly available plastics, like polyvinyl chlo-
ride (PVC), acrylic, and polyethylene.4 Nitrous oxide is commonly 
used as an oxidizer, primarily because it’s easier to concentrate in 
liquid form than pure oxygen.
Small hybrid rocket motors gained popularity with large-scale 
model rocket enthusiasts in the United States after 9/11 when 
shipping solid rocket motors for large-scale models became 
increasingly difficult. Early versions used PVC as the fuel and liq-
uid nitrous oxide in aluminum or composite tanks small enough 
to fit within the rocket tube. Modelers experimented with a vari-
ety of different fuels, including cast rubber and machined and/or 
3D printed polymers. Polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) became 
a popular option due to its availability, low cost, ease of ignition, 
high combustion temperature, and minimal production of harm-
ful byproducts during combustion. Typical model rocket engines 
produce an impulse lasting from 0.5 to 4.0 seconds, with thrust 
levels ranging from about 20 to 100 Newtons.5
APPLICATION TO THE DESTRUCTION OF UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE 
(UXO) BY DEFLAGRATION
A hybrid rocket motor is intended to produce high pressures in 
a confined chamber to eject gases at high velocity to create thrust, 
usually for a relatively short duration. A suitable torch for burn-
ing explosives need not produce thrust but does need to run for a 
longer period of time. Ideally, it would also be able to be throttled, 
and so easily started and stopped. The HTL, shown in Figure 2, 
meets all of these requirements. It produces a focused flame that 
exits the fuel tube at a relatively low pressure, producing a very 
minimal thrust reaction, and burns for a much longer time than 
Figure 1. Schematic view of the basic component of a Hybrid Rocket Motor.
Figure courtesy of Emily Bean Design.
Figure 2. Basic components of the Hybrid Thermal Lance.
Figure courtesy of Emily Bean Design.
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a similarly sized hybrid rocket motor. Also, since the HTL is sta-
tionary while functioning and need not be light enough to fly, the 
use of gaseous oxygen is practical. Gaseous oxygen used for oxy-
acetylene welding is very suitable and readily available virtually 
anywhere in the world. Medical oxygen can be used but high pu-
rity oxygen is not required. The HTL is fueled by a consumable 
plastic tube, which can be easily machined from stock, cast, or 
3-D printed plastic shapes. PMMA (more commonly known as 
acrylic), was chosen for the initial laboratory tests and also the 
first field trials of the HTL, and found to be practical and effec-
tive. The HTL requires very little energy to ignite, and remote 
ignition can be achieved with a small electric arc or similar meth-
ods. The field tests described on the next page used an electric 
match for the ignition source, operated from the firing point by 
standard demolition equipment.
During early development, simple tests conducted by Pratt and 
his students in the Collaboratory using plastic tubing and gaseous 
oxygen were encouraging enough to warrant the construction of 
a fireproof test chamber equipped with high-impact glass obser-
vation ports, shown in Figure 3. Simple prototype fuel tubes were 
machined from 1" diameter acrylic rod stock cut in 4" lengths. A 
¼" diameter hole was drilled down the center of each rod, and one 
end was threaded for 1/8" national pipe threads (NPT). Figure 4 
Figure 3. Fireproof test chamber used for initial prototype testing in the laboratory.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
Figure 4. Prototype HTL fuel tubes made of 1” diameter 4” long 
PMMA  before and after testing.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
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shows an unused fuel tube alongside one that has been subject-
ed to four 30-second burns. A 3" long brass nipple was threaded 
into a bulkhead fitting that passed through the end plate on the 
test box. The oxygen was delivered through a rubber hose con-
nected to an oxy-acetylene torch oxygen tank, using a stock regu-
lator. Noting that the hose could potentially become a fuel source 
if the flame were allowed to propagate back through the tube, an 
aluminum plug was pressed into the outlet end of the brass nip-
ple, with a 0.05" diameter hole drilled through the center to create 
a venturi to block propagation of the flame front. An emergency 
shutoff valve and an adjustable metering valve were attached to 
the brass tube to provide precise control of the oxygen flow to the 
test sample.
Tests confirmed that the HTL was easily ignited and controlled 
by adjusting the flow of oxygen. Even at relatively low flow rates of 
under 0.5 cubic feet per minute, the HTL proved capable of pro-
ducing an intense flame, which was easily throttled and quick-
ly extinguished by simply cutting off the oxygen supply. While 
the ignition temperature of PMMA is only about 450°C, the 
combustion temperature is considerably higher. PMMA burns in 
the presence of oxygen and produces monomer methyl methacry-
late (MMA), which decomposes to generate methane, methanol, 
propylene, formaldehyde, acetone, acetylene, etc. These molecule 
products undergo combustion and produce carbon monoxide 
(CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), water vapors, and other gases with 
the generation of high temperatures. For purposes of comparison, 
thermite burns at temperatures between 2,200° and 2,500° C, and 
a properly adjusted oxy-acetylene torch can reach temperatures 
close to 3,500° C. During initial tests in the laboratory, the de-
structive power of the HTL was evaluated by placing a 3" cylin-
drical block of pine 1.5" diameter at a distance of about 2" from 
the outlet of the fuel tube.5 Significant removal of material from 
the wood block occurred after only 20 seconds of exposure to the 
HTL, as shown in Figure 5. A similar test on an identical block of 
wood using an oxy-acetylene torch did roughly the same amount 
of damage to the test block, and while precise measurement of the 
HTL flame temperature has yet to be confirmed, it would appear 
that it is comparable to an oxy-acetylene torch.
Figure 5. 3" diameter wood test sample after 20 second exposure to the HTL.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
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Figure 6: Test setup using the HTL to destroy a simulated IED explosive charge (loose-fill ammonium nitrate-based explosives).
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
Figure 7. Complete destruction of the simulated IED explosive charge.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
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Figure 8. Test setup using the HTL to destroy a Pakistani P3 Mk2 anti-tank mine.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
Figure 9. Nothing remained of the P3 Mk2 anti-tank mine after exposure to the HTL.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
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Figure 10. Test setup using the HTL to destroy a PG-2 grenade.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
Figure 11. Penetration of the casing of the PG-2 grenade by the HTL.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
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Figure 12. Test setup using the HTL to destroy a Soviet TM-62M anti-tank mine.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
Figure 13. Remnants of the TM-62M anti-tank mine after exposure to the HTL.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
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FIELD TESTS IN AFGHANISTAN
After obtaining these initial results, it was decided that there was 
sufficient justification to go ahead with field trials where the HTL 
could be tested on real mines and UXO. After discussion with 
HALO staff, Afghanistan was selected as a suitable site for test-
ing, as it supplied access to range facilities, availability of live ord-
nance, and access to a well-established local office, which provided 
expertise, technical assistance, and infrastructure. In April 2018, 
the prototype HTL was taken to Afghanistan, where Pratt, Torbet, 
and Afghan HALO staff performed tests on four different types of 
ordnance at the HALO explosives range north of Kabul.
The first test was conducted using a variety of loose ammonium 
nitrate-based explosive materials placed in a plastic container, 
simulating an improvised explosive device’s (IED) main charge, 
shown in Figure 6.7 An acrylic fuel tube was installed and the HTL 
was connected to a tank of compressed oxygen through a two-
stage regulator and a metering valve. The regulator was adjusted 
to 5 psi. The HTL was placed approximately 2" from the plastic 
container and an electric match, locally sourced in Kabul, was in-
serted in the end of the fuel tube. Oxygen flow was established, 
and the electric match ignited. The flow of oxygen was allowed 
to continue for about 30 seconds and then shut off. Observers at 
500 meters communicating by radio reported smoke and flames, 
which persisted for several minutes. After the requisite waiting 
period, the test site was examined, and it was quickly determined 
that the explosives had been completely consumed by burning, 
leaving only a small amount of residue from the plastic container, 
as shown in Figure 7. It was clear that the HTL had ignited the ex-
plosives and stimulated combustion to the point where they were 
sufficiently engaged so that when the HTL was extinguished, the 
burn continued until the explosives were fully consumed, with-
out causing detonation.
Figure 8 shows a plastic-encased, unfuzed P3 Mk2 anti-tank 
mine used for the second test.8 Setup of the HTL was very simi-
lar to that used for the first test, except that the oxygen flow was 
allowed to continue for about two minutes, long enough for the 
1” diameter and 4” long acrylic fuel tube to be completely con-
sumed. Observers reported a great deal of smoke and flame, 
which persisted for a longer period of time than during the first 
test. Figure 9 clearly shows results similar to that of the first test; 
the mine, including the case and all of the explosive material, 
was completely consumed. The photograph also shows that the 
intensity of the flames from the burning mine melted and sepa-
rated the hose connecting the oxygen tank to the HTL. However, 
since the oxygen had been turned off two minutes into the test, 
the hose did not continue to burn. The metal parts of the HTL 
Figure 14. Staff at the Halo Afghanistan HQ in Kabul carry out further testing of the HTL on sheet steel.
Figure courtesy of Donald Pratt.
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Figure 15. An Afghan EOD specialist using the HTL to destroy a simulated IED during a training session.
Figure courtesy of John Montgomery.
Figure 16. The HTL shortly after ignition burning through the plastic casing of a simulated IED explosive charge.
Figure courtesy of John Montgomery.
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were slightly scorched, but otherwise undamaged. The hose was 
simply trimmed back and reattached to the HTL, after which test-
ing continued.
The third test was performed on a Soviet-era PG-2, as shown in 
Figure 10.9 The HTL was aimed at the side of the case where the 
main charge was located, to try to avoid setting off either the fuse 
or the booster. As can be seen from Figure 11, the HTL made a hole 
in the case roughly 35 millimeters in diameter, and ignited the 
explosive material inside without detonation occurring. With no 
easy way to safely examine the inside of the grenade, it was diffi-
cult to assess the state of the main explosive fill, fuze, and booster, 
so the decision was made to ensure the complete destruction of the 
grenade using a small explosive charge. After examining the rem-
nants, it appeared that the fuze and booster had been consumed 
by the burn initiated by the HTL, but this could not be established 
for certain. More testing on RPG-type ordnance is indicated.
The fourth test was made on an unfuzed TM-62M anti-tank 
mine, which has a metal case.10 Considering that the prototype 
HTL with 1" diameter and 4" long fuel tubes has a maximum burn 
time of only two minutes, the team were unsure of its ability to 
penetrate the case and fully deflagrate the explosive material. As 
shown in Figure 12 the HTL was placed at an angle to the case 
to reduce the possibility of the HTL flame reaching the booster 
charge before the outer HE explosive was fully engaged. Shortly 
after completing the HTL triggering sequence, the observation 
team reported smoke and flames, which continued and increased 
after the oxygen supply to the HTL was cut off. During this test, 
the mine emitted loud and varied roaring sounds. After examin-
ing the remnants, we surmised that these sounds were made by 
the hot gases from the burning explosive material exiting the case 
through the hole made by the HTL. Smoke, flames, and noises 
persisted for at least ten minutes after the HTL was extinguished. 
Subsequent examination of the remnants of the mine revealed 
complete destruction of the explosive material, as shown in Figure 
13; all that remained was a tattered metal case filled with ashes.
With these encouraging results on targets containing live ex-
plosive fill, the question of how well the HTL could penetrate 
steel plate was briefly investigated at the HALO office in Kabul, 
shown in Figure 14, where the HTL was found to be capable of 
cutting a 10–15 millimeter hole through sheet steel several mil-
limeters thick in under 20 seconds. Following these successful 
tests, the decision was made to take advantage of an opportunity 
for HALO EOD staff to be introduced to the HTL. A number of 
Afghanistan national staff were participating in an EOD train-
ing course at the same time that the HTL field trials were under-
way, and the HTL was somewhat hastily incorporated into that 
course and used during a number of training tasks against “dry 
targets” (i.e. non-explosive dummy devices), as shown in Figures 
15 and 16. This provided an additional opportunity to uncover 
operational challenges that might present in the field and to make 
a first pass at incorporation of the HTL into EOD task proce-
dures. Back at the Collaboratory, testing is underway to further 
establish operational parameters, but it appears quite likely that 
the HTL will prove suitable for the penetration and destruction 
of thin-cased metal ordnance.
OPERATIONAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS AND STANDARD  
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) 
As well as being technically functional, a key concern for the end 
user is that the equipment is at least as safe as other EOD meth-
ods as well as being operationally practical. While the testing was 
conducted under the tight control of the Afghanistan program’s 
demolition range safety procedures, HALO is still establishing the 
SOPs for how the HTL will be deployed operationally once out of 
the prototype stage.
A primary safety consideration is that although a high order det-
onation is unlikely while using the HTL, it must still be consid-
ered as a possibility. Also, the HTL will require placement in close 
proximity to a potentially hazardous item of explosive ordnance. 
Any EOD operator must take both of these into account when de-
ploying the equipment. Principals such as minimal time at target, 
initiation from a protected shelter or safe distance, personal pro-
tective equipment, safety distances, equipment emplacement, etc., 
must mirror those of conventional EOD techniques when a high 
order is expected. In addition, the HTL induces a burn the dura-
tion of which will depend on the nature of the target and environ-
mental factors. A detonation could occur at any time during the 
burn, particularly if the explosive ordnance is fitted with a fuze or 
booster. As such an igniferous soak will be required following use 
of the HTL before the EOD operator can approach the target, con-
firm successful destruction, and collapse any cordon.11
For field purposes the HTL will need to be initiated remotely to 
ensure no positive EOD action takes place while the operator is 
in the vicinity of the target area. During field testing of the initial 
prototype, two methods were employed to achieve this: placing 
the tank on a short hose near the target, leaving the oxygen run-
ning, returning to the firing point (protected bunker) and initi-
ating the burn using an electric match on a length of firing cable, 
and alternatively, running a long hose (80+ meters) from the tank 
at the firing point to the fuel tube. In the latter case, both control-
ling the oxygen flow and initiating the burn were conducted from 
the firing point, which required two people. Clearly, neither of 
these methods would be particularly practical in the field as the 
setup is a relatively complex procedure and control of the oxygen 
flow is somewhat haphazard. Additionally, when the longer hose 
is employed, there is the potential for the hose itself to become 
a conduit for the propagation of flame back to the firing point, 
if a violent burn or high order should separate the venturi tube 
56
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss2/1
ISSUE 22.2 @ AUGUST 2018 57
Donald Pratt, Ph.D.
Professor of Engineering
Messiah College (U.S.)
Donald Pratt, Ph.D., has taught engineering at 
Messiah College since 1993. He is co-founder 
of the Collaboratory for Strategic Partnerships 
and Applied Research, and has mentored many 
student projects over the years involving such 
diverse topics as electric vehicles, alternative 
energy, light sport aircraft, detection and re-
mediation of landmines, and low-cost pros-
thetics for developing countries. He has a 
background in electrical, mechanical, and civil engineering and holds 
degrees from Case Western Reserve University and Cornell University, 
and a Certificate of Biblical Studies from the Moody Bible Institute.
Nick Torbet
Head of Programme Development
The HALO Trust
Nick Torbet is responsible for setting up and de-
veloping new programs and technical projects as 
part of HALO’s Capability Group, currently with a 
particular focus on the Middle East. He was previ-
ously HALO’s Program Manager in Laos and 
Operations Manager in Ukraine. Before HALO he 
served as a British Army Officer for over ten years, 
specializing in explosive ordnance disposal.
and provide a source of ignition for the oxygen-filled hose. Thus, 
one of the key future developments will be a means of placing the 
equipment in its entirety in the vicinity of the target and initiat-
ing the procedure from the firing point. A longer venturi tube 
and protective stand will also assist with safe placement against 
more challenging targets. Work on this has already begun, and 
the next prototype will likely employ a smaller tank fitted with 
an electronic delay timer connected to a solenoid valve to control 
the flow of oxygen, all of which could be located near the target to 
simplify the procedure.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE USE
After successful demonstration of the proof of concept in the lab-
oratory, the prototype HTL has been tested under actual field con-
ditions and found to be quite effective for consuming explosive 
material by deflagration. The ability of the HTL to quickly pen-
etrate metal several millimeters thick makes it suitable for both 
plastic and metal encased ordnance. Apart from exposing a suit-
able target surface, using the HTL does not require contact with 
the ordnance that is to be destroyed, reducing the risk to the EOD 
operator during set up. If a device does function during the burn-
ing process, the parts of the HTL exposed to the explosion are in-
expensive and easily replaced. The HTL is simple and inexpensive 
to make, and consists of parts and materials that are not regulated, 
and can be shipped without difficulty, and will pass easily through 
airport security. Pressurized gaseous oxygen of sufficient quality 
can be readily sourced virtually anywhere in the world. Thus the 
HTL has great potential for becoming an inexpensive, effective, 
and practical tool for the destruction of explosive ordnance in a 
variety of situations, particularly those where the use of secondary 
explosive charges is expensive or impractical.
In the short term, HALO anticipates that the HTL will be partic-
ularly suited for deployment against thin, plastic-cased IED main 
charges (especially following mechanical clearance operations), 
thin-cased cluster munitions, or smaller sensitive devices such as 
grenades on tripwires where explosive donor charge placement is 
more challenging.12 In particular, the HTL is expected to be well 
suited for use in locations with security concerns such as Syria, 
Iraq, and Ukraine.
The HTL concept is not patented and is hereby released as open 
source, with the intent that it will be widely used to hasten the 
day when all people in all places may walk the earth in safety. 
Comments, questions, suggestions for improvement, and poten-
tial applications are invited.
FUTURE WORK
Parametric studies of fuel tube geometry are underway to deter-
mine the optimum size and shape for each category of ordnance 
to be destroyed. Precise measurement of the oxygen flow and tests 
carried out at various flow rates are expected to lead to the devel-
opment of an automated system for controlling the flow of oxy-
gen. Continuing field testing on different types of live targets will 
yield a better understanding of the required flame characteristics 
and burn duration required to insure complete destruction of var-
ious types of target UXO and allow a detailed SOP to be written 
for each. 
Based on the information obtained during the field trials de-
scribed previously, a new prototype is being developed with a 
smaller oxygen tank that is placed closer to the device being de-
stroyed. The flow of oxygen is regulated by a timer-controlled 
valve, allowing a set delay and precise burn time. Once the HTL is 
in position, the user simply starts the timer and returns to a safe 
position. After the set delay time, the user triggers the electric 
match and the rest of the sequence is carried out automatically. 
Depending on the size of the oxygen tank and the chosen burn du-
ration, several burns can be carried out with a single fill and refill-
ing the small tank in the field from a larger tank is quick and easy. 
Also, the decision was made to go with single-use fuel tubes on 
this second prototype, and a variety of diameters and lengths are 
being tested to determine the optimum tube size for each specific 
type of explosive ordnance to be destroyed. 
See endnotes page 63
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Shattered Lives and Bodies: Recovery of Survivors of Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosive Remnants 
of War in Northeast Syria by MSF  [ from page 24 ]
1. Names have been changed.
How Iraq Is Changing What We Do: Measuring Clearance in Urban Environments by Lodhammar [ from page 
30 ]
1. Stabilization definitions vary but generally it is understood to be a combination of military, humanitarian, political and eco-
nomic activities that together bring stability to areas affected by violent conflict. In Iraq, the word stabilization is 
most often associated with the Funding Facility for Stabilization, managed by the United Nations Development 
Programme in collaboration with the Government of Iraq.
1. Decisions of the Higher Committee for Mine Action (HCMA) Meeting № 2 of 2017 held on Wednesday 29 November 2017.
2. IEDs used as substitutes for conventional landmines in a ‘belt’ configuration to defend a combatant position during a conflict meet 
the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) definition of landmine.
3. Note: The IMAS Review Board has agreed to develop an IMAS on Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD). The need to clar-
ify a standard of clearance where ‘depth’ is not a suitable measurement is being considered. 
4. Based on unconfirmed reports.
5. Economic theories differ as to ‘how much’ for ‘how many’ and ‘how soon’ when setting objectives and guidelines for societal wel-
fare and distribution of individual benefits. In his essay What Utilitarianism Is, John Stuart Mill defined utility as “the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, (which) holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
promote the reverse of happiness.” In his theory of efficient economic allocation, Vilfredo Pareto argued that no one individual 
should be made better off while making at least one individual worse off. Other economists have suggested that “Pareto improve-
ments” consider offsetting compensation for those disadvantaged by one government improvement that favors others so as to main-
tain a “Pareto efficient outcome” also considered the basic theorem of welfare economics. 
6. Just as IMAS should include guidance on a standard for clearance in a 3-dimensional environment, so, too, should IMAS include a 
standard for threat assessment to ensure that organizations are properly considering risks.
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Sepon Supports UXO Clearance in Laos by Aneka and Valent  [ from page 40 ]
1. The Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Problem and Operational Progress in the Lao PDR.” NRA. http://bit.ly/2DH1U0f. Accessed 6 
June 2018.
2. Under the Mineral Exploration and Production Agreement between the Government of Lao PDR and LXML signed in 1993. 
3. “MMG LXML Sepon Supports 3000 Years of Cultural Heritage and Lao History.” MMG. 22 August 2016 http://bit.ly/2G7nIaS. 
Accessed 6 June 2018.
62
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss2/1
ISSUE 22.1 @ APRIL 2018 63
4. “Seeking safer roads around Sepon mine.” MMG. 12 October 2010. http://bit.ly/2DFQnhO. Accessed 6 June 2018. 
5. Sunlalob Renewable Energy. http://bit.ly/2IEcsB8. 
6. “Sepon mine provides lasting clean water.” MMG. 1 November 2011. http://bit.ly/2pqOelL. Accessed 6 June 2018.
7. “MMG LXML Sepon partners with the Australian Government to improve agriculture productivity.” MMG. 27 July 2017. https://
bit.ly/2Jxzs7Y. Accessed 4 June 2018. 
8. Transient electromagnetics, (also time-domain electromagnetics or TDEM), is a geophysical exploration technique in which elec-
tric and magnetic fields are induced by transient pulses of electric current and the subsequent decay response measured.
9. UXO Lao Detection Trial Test Report. GICHD. July 2015 http://bit.ly/2u6jr2w. Accessed 6 June 2018. 
10. LXML has achieved 0 UXO-related incidents or injuries that would require medical treatment, including any minor injuries such 
as bruises and minor cuts.
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tion in Laos. The name of the company in Laos is Lane Xang Minerals Limited (LXML), of which MMG owns 90% and the Lao 
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2. National Regulatory Authority (NRA) is a public institution of the Lao Government. It is responsible for regulation and coordina-
tion of all UXO operators in the country working on the impact of unexploded bombs, artillery shells, grenades, landmines and 
like ordnance. 
3. The overarching aims of the NRA are to enable all people in Lao PDR to live free from the threat of UXO, help promote national de-
velopment, and see UXO victims fully integrated into society and ensure their needs are comprehensively met. More info at www.
nra.gov.la. 
4. UXO Lao (Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Programme) was established by the Lao Government with the support of NUDP, 
UNICEF and other stakeholders in 1996. UXO Lao is working in the nine most impacted provinces nationwide, clearing land for 
agriculture and community purposed as well as other development activities. More info at www.uxolao.org. 
5. Cooperative Orthotic Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) was established by the Lao Ministry of Health in 1997 to ensure that people 
with physical disabilities have local, affordable access to a quality, nationally-managed rehabilitation service. More info at www.
copelaos.org. 
THE HYBRID THERMAL LANCE: A PROMISING NEW TECHNIQUE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF LANDMINES AND 
UXO BY DEFLAGRATION BY PRATT AND TORBET [ FROM PAGE 46 ]
1. McInally, Craig and Risser, Hans (2017) “Humanitarian Mine Action and IEDs,” Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction: 
Vol. 21: Iss. 3, Article 10; Rhodes, Guy (2017) “Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards,” Journal 
of Conventional Weapons Destruction: Vol. 21: Iss. 3, Article 3
2. Patel, Divyakant (2009) “Proper Usage of Torch Systems for In-Situ Landmine Neutralization by Burning for Humanitarian 
Demining,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 43
3. In some areas there are generally no issues with thermite importing and licensing; however, thermite becomes difficult to obtain 
once it is “weaponized” as an EOD tool.
4. Novozhilov, Joseph, Ishiko, Shimada, Wang, and Liu (2011) “Polymer Combustion as a Basis for Hybrid Propulsion: A Comprehensive 
Review and New Numerical Approaches,” Energies Journal: Vol 4: ISSN 1779-1839; doi:10.3390
5. Phone interview with Douglas Pratt of Pratt Hobbies, Inc.
6. Wood was chosen mainly because the use of hazardous materials (explosives in particular) is strictly controlled on the Messiah 
College campus. Wood, while it does burn, degrades relatively slowly while burning, and thus makes for a good comparison of the 
ability of the HTL to degrade a combustible material. 
7. These were homemade explosives recovered from the field.
8. The P3 Mk2 anti-tank mine contained approximately 5 kg of TNT.
9. The PG-2 contained a TNT/RDX based shaped charge
10. The TM-62M anti-tank mine contained approximately 7.5 kg of TNT.
11. The term “igniferous soak” refers to a safe waiting period following EOD action involving a burn. HALO’s SOPs for any EOD burn-
ing mandate a 30-minute wait from the last signs of fire or smoke.
12. Such items are often mounted on stakes or trees above ground level. Placing an explosive donor charge in these instances, particu-
larly in the vicinity of tripwires, is challenging. Although the use of EOD tools such as shaped charges can mitigate this to a degree.
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Children play in a freshly harvested potato ﬁ eld in Bamyan, Afghanistan.
Photo courtesy of UN Photo/Aurora V. Alambra.
EDITORIAL
Landmine Free 2025: 
A Shared Responsibility
Achieving the goals set forth by the Anti-personal Mine Ban Conven-
tion (APMBC) continues to be an international eﬀ ort as organiza-
tions work to clear mineﬁ elds in countries around the world. On 4 
April 2017, during a reception of the 20th anniversary of Diana, Prin-
cess of Wales’ visit to a mineﬁ eld in Angola, Prince Harry launched 
an initiative to promote these goals: Landmine Free 2025. Through 
the cooperation of multiple organizations, the world has seen signif-
icant progress in humanitarian mine action but needs the addition-
al support of donor governments and private supports to realize the 
commitment made at the 2014 Maputo Review Conference of the 
APMBC: clearance by 2025. What steps can the international com-
munity take to achieve this goal? How are organizations contributing 
to Landmine Free 2015? Which lessons learned can we share to im-
prove our ability to collaborate and achieve a landmine free world? 
SPOTLIGHT
Central/South Asia
How do Soviet-era munitions and landmines aﬀ ect the shared and 
disputed borders in Central Asia? What kind of explosive contamina-
tion have past wars and conﬂ ict left behind in South Asia? What re-
mains to be cleared and how are local populations aﬀ ected? Do socio-
cultural considerations impact clearance eﬀ orts in these regions? And 
what advice do organizations operating in Central/South Asia have for 
those seeking to work there? 
Of particular interest are: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
 
FEATURE
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
in Mine Action
Increasingly, the humanitarian mine action community leverages un-
manned aircraft systems (UAS) for various uses within the ﬁ eld. How 
has drone technology impacted HMA activities such as battle area clear-
ance, landmine detection, and survey? What opportunities do UAS oﬀ er 
organizations and what kind of concerns do they raise? How can these 
devices ensure the successful release of land and what steps should we 
take to ensure this technology is implemented appropriately into HMA?
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